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Abstract
In this paper, I propose that visual perception is a straightforward
case of (mental) representation. The phenomenology of vision is key
here: as we see, we are directly presented with aspects of the environ-
ment that are at various distances away from us. Through the process
of vision, aspects of the environment that would otherwise still be un-
available or \absent", are made (quasi-)available, or (quasi-)present.
This already by itself makes vision deserving of the name `represen-
tational'. Moreover, all of this holds true, even if we suppose that
vision is \direct" and intrinsically \contentless". In part I, I provide
a bit of an overview of the relevant theoretical landscape, and I give
my own take on how we may frame and approach some of the issues
with respect to mental representation. Then, in part II, I argue that
the representational features of vision must primarily be sought at
the level of conscious experience. In part III, I elaborate on the two
most common theories that are associated with the view that vision
is `representational', and proceed to show that there is in fact a third,
more direct, way in which vision can be considered as essentially a
process of representation. Finally, in part IV, I show that the kind of
interaction problems that arise with the more traditional notions of
representation also arise with this newer, more direct, notion.
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IWhy do human beings behave the way they do? According to common sense,
people do the things they do because they have certain beliefs and desires.
For example, we might catch a person walking a very intricate route through
a city. Upon asking why (s)he is walking this intricate path, (s)he answers
that (s)he does so, because (s)he desires to buy some bread, and because
(s)he believes that there is a store located at a particular place, and that so
and so is the way to get there.
In most of the literature on \folk-psychology", beliefs and desires are
thought of as instances of what are called `propositional attitudes'. They are
instances in which an agent bears a certain relationship, a certain psycholog-
ical attitude, towards a proposition. Propositions, in turn, may, for now, be
understood as items that specify `conditions of satisfaction'.1 This property
is also inherited by the propositional attitudes themselves. To illustrate, the
belief that Paris is located about 750 kilometers south of Amsterdam can be
true or false. And the desire for more bicycle sheds in the center of Ams-
terdam can be satised or frustrated. Propositional attitudes explain human
behavior because people are taken generally to behave in accordance with
how they take the world to be, and in accordance with how they would like
the world to be.
We might say that according to \folk psychology", propositional attitudes
are causally responsible for behavior. Whether this is also true is, however, a
point of contention, especially among philosophers and other theorists of the
mind. Indeed, the behaviorists of the beginning of the twentieth century are
notorious for having denied the idea that beliefs and desires are among the
actual causes of human behavior. One of the more obvious diculties with
the view that human behavior is inuenced by beliefs and desires, is that it is
committed to the existence of special sorts of mental items that, moreover,
causally interact with the physical world. From the scientic-materialist
1The exact nature of propositions is a controversial issue among philosophers. But the
characterization that I have just given will do for our present purposes.
2
point of view, such commitments are, on the face of it, problematic.
First of all, mental items, such as beliefs, desires, and other propositional
attitudes, don't seem to admit of being scientically measured. Peer inside
the brain for as long as you like; it seems that nothing like a belief or a desire
shows up.2 Second, many theorists think that the supposition that some
physical events have mental causes, is dicult to square with the so-called
\causal closure" of the physical world { which is the view that every physical
event has a sucient physical cause.
However, in the fties and sixties of the twentieth century, a new way of
thinking about the mind developed that, some thought, showed that a sci-
entically and materialistically acceptable account of the folk psychological
theory of behavior, might be given after all. This new way of thinking was
strongly inspired by the advent of the computer, and has often been referred
to as `the computational theory of mind'. However, because dierent theo-
rists now seem to have dierent views about just what computation is, this
label might be somewhat misleading, because, to put it briey, it may sug-
gest, to the reader, an inappropriately wide spectrum of theories.3 Therefore,
I am going to refer to it, following Andy Clark (Clark; 1989), as `classical
cognitivism'.
Classical cognitivists maintain that the brain is an organ that is sys-
tematically engaged in processes of formal symbol manipulation.4 What is
important about this idea is, among other things, that it supposes that there
are items { or patterns of neuronal activation if you will { inside the brain
that possess semantic properties. Items that, in other words, carry meaning.
Moreover, because these items are physical in nature, they have causal pow-
ers. Indeed, according to classical cognitivism, these symbols in fact play a
systematic causal role in the production of behavior.
2But then again, what do beliefs and desires look like anyway?
3See (Copeland; 1996), (Fresco; 2010), and the various articles written by Gualtiero
Piccinini (Piccinini; 2008), (Piccinini; 2009), and (Piccinini; 2012).
4For early formulations of this idea, see (McCulloch and Pitts; 1943) and (Newell and
Simon; 1976).
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The idea that the brain is a formal symbol manipulator, has led some
theorist to suspect that there may be a way to show, how, and indeed scien-
tically justify that, folk psychological explanations can be true of physical
organisms such as human beings.5 After all, if the brain is a formal sym-
bol manipulator, then this seems to provide a way of \materializing" the
so-called propositional attitudes, and to give them a place and causal role
within the physical world. If the propositions that gure in beliefs and desires
are expressed symbolically inside the brain, and if the attitudes towards them
correspond to specic algorithmic procedures, then, it seems, we are already
well on our way of having a scientically and materialistically acceptable
account of folk psychology.
Over the last decades, however, many have, in various ways, expressed
their dissent with respect to this promise of a scientic vindication of folk psy-
chology. Some have argued that folk psychology is a false framework to begin
with, and that we therefore simply need not bother to try to scientically
vindicate it.6 Others argue that, whereas there might be a (greater or lesser)
truth in folk psychology, classical cognitivism simply isn't the right kind of
theory to back it up, while the hypothesis that the brain performs, at some
level or other, formal symbol manipulations could, despite that, nevertheless
be a scientically fruitful idea.7 Yet others, most notably connectionists,
deny that the brain is the kind of formal symbol manipulator that classical
cognitivists maintain it is.8 Instead, they suppose that, although the brain is
a kind of computer, its computational processes are implemented by neural
networks, and are, contrary to what classical cognitivists suppose, performed
in parallel, at a sub-symbolic level.
My own concern, however, is with another kind of criticism. This criticism
5This view has been most prominently and systematically developed and defended
by Jerry Fodor (Fodor; 1975), (Fodor; 1981), (Fodor; 1987). Steven Pinker is another
prominent example (Pinker; 1997).
6(Churchland; 1989)
7(Ramsey; 2007)
8(Smolensky; 1988), (Churchland; 1989)
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is about the role of meaning, or representation, in physicalist accounts of
cognition. A lot of this has to do with what some have termed \The Problem
of Causal Impotence".9 This is the problem of showing how representational
content { the purported meanings of the symbols { can be causally ecacious.
Alternatively, one could say, it is the problem of showing how the familiar
physicalist accounts of cognition can still leave room for content to serve a
purpose in cognition.
As a starting point, we may draw attention to the implicit distinction,
made in many theories of cognition, between representational vehicle and
representational content. Simply put, it concerns the distinction between the
symbol itself and what the symbol means. The problem of causal impotence
arises from the fact that, on the standard accounts of computation, all the
actual causal work is done solely by the vehicular properties of the symbols.
In other words, what the symbols mean does, in this respect, not seem to
have any relevance.
In response to this, some theorists have proposed that we really ought
to eliminate the notion of representation in theorizing about cognition. One
of the more early proponents of this view is Steven Stich who, at least at
that time, proposed what he called a \syntactic theory of mind".10 Briey
put, his idea is that we should just forget about the meaning of symbols
entirely, and only focus on the actual system of syntactic operations that
is implemented in the brain. Following Stich, many other theorists seem to
have begun to entertain a non-representational understanding of cognition.
This seems to have started, roughly, with Rodney Brooks' article Intelligence
Without Representation, and has most recently led to the formulation of a
view called Radical Enactivism.11
Ever since these non-representational views have come to the fore, there
has been an ongoing debate about the role of representation in cognition.
9(Hutto; 1999)
10(Stich; 1983)
11(Brooks; 1991), (Hutto; 2011), (Hutto and Myin; 2013), and (Degenaar and Myin;
2014).
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Representationalists argue that representations are essential, whereas non-
representationalists deny this. Much of the philosophical diculties here,
seem to have to do with the problem of how we might distinguish between
systems that actually do employ representations from systems that don't.
In fact, this may very well be impossible if, as some claim, the very notion
of representation actually lacks a clear empirical operationalization.12 Intu-
itively, I certainly see the diculty of nding representation, as it were, \in
the lab". Perhaps, adopting a non-representational framework might be the
appropriate thing to do after all.
Perhaps... But before we do so, I think it is important that we pay
attention to a phenomenon, that most participants in the debate seem to
neglect, consciously or unconsciously. A phenomenon that seems paradoxical
in light of the idea that, as far as the the mechanics of cognition and behavior
go, it is really only the vehicular side of representation that does all the
important work (as some suggest). It concerns the fact that, subjectively
speaking, thoughts appear to have the property of being transparent. What I
mean by this, is that when we observe what our thoughts are actually like,
\from the inside" as it were, it seems that what we nd, is precisely the
content of those thoughts, rather than any of the underlying vehicles that,
supposedly, are \carrying" these contents.13 It is as if in thinking we are
already beyond the thought, and with the thing itself.
Although I shall have to say more about this, intuitively, this seeming
transparency is puzzling in light of the idea that the brain really is a \syn-
tactically driven engine"14; an organ whose internal functioning proceeds on
the basis of the local formal mechanics of its physiological parts. For it
12(Haselager et al.; 2003)
13But see (Churchland; 1985) for a dissenting view. The idea that mental states are
transparent is usually mainly applied to perceptual states (Harman; 1990), (Tye; 2002).
(This is often appealed to in order to show that we are never aware of any qualitative
properties of experience, i.e. \qualia".) But I think that the phenomenon of transparency
carries over to mental states of a more \o line" variety as well. See also (Evans; 1982, p.
225) for what seems to be a similar view.
14(Dennett; 1998)
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seems that in thought, we are actually directly aware of the very referents
of thought. And thus it would seem that these very referents themselves,
non-local as they are, have, in fact, a direct impact on us. For example,
when I think about the moon, it seems as though the moon itself becomes
somehow present to my mind. Or, at the very least, there is a very tangible
feeling that, through the act of thinking, one actually establishes some sort of
mental contact with the moon.15 (How else would you be able to think about
it?) In eect, it appears as though one is directly aware of something that is
spatially, as well as temporally, distanced from oneself. And thus, it appears
as though one is directly aected by something that is itself non-local.
When we think about this transparent nature of our mental states, what
readily comes to mind is the fact that our inner mental lives appear to be
characterized by a certain sort of openness, that, indeed, is not, in any obvi-
ous way, suggested by the thought of formal mechanics driving computational
processes inside the brain. Indeed, the mind appears to be eld-like rather
than point-like. It harbors a certain wideness, or extensiveness, that is dif-
cult to reconcile with the image of 86 billion interacting neurons packed
together in a small area of 1273:6 cm3. (Who, in his or her rational mind,
would ever expect that a particular house, upon entering it, turns out to be
much bigger on the inside that its outside appears to allow!)
What is, moreover, characteristic of this \mental eld", is that, through
the act of thinking, it apparently manages to stretch itself far beyond the
spatiotemporal connes of the bodies' own physical embeddedness. Indeed,
15Dreams, I believe, also illustrate this phenomenon very well. For example, suppose
that you have a dream in which you talk to a loved one that has already passed away, and
that you deeply miss. Doesn't it seem to you as if the person him or herself is actually
there? In any case, most of us seem to highly value such dreams. This, it seems to me,
has a lot to do with the fact that, in dreams, our experience is that they actually seem to
be there in person. When we dream, it is not as though we are merely talking to mental
images of the deceased. In that case, the signicance and value of such dreams would
probably not be that great. Moreover, I predict that even in case one becomes \lucid"
during such a conversation, most of us would still treat the appearance in the dream as
though it was the actual person him- or herself.
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one could argue that thinking just is dissociating oneself from one's current
physical surroundings. For in thinking we essentially seem to turn our mental
regard to someplace and sometime else. This, at the very least, seems what
the bulk of our conscious thinking processes are like.
Not only are we able to think about (or should we say \ think towards"?)
the past and the future, we also have the capacity to conceive of alternative
or hypothetical realities. Moreover, through the act of thinking, we seem
able to get into view, things that allegedly exist outside of space and time
altogether, such as mathematical objects. Our mental capacities also seem to
furnish us with a grasp of things of a specically more meta-physical nature
as well. For example, we seem to have some sense of the world as a whole,
and seem able to contemplate such things as totality. Indeed, through our
thoughtfulness, we even have the ability to cognize, and appreciate, the bare
fact of reality, or existence, as such. So in various ways, thought literally
appears to broaden our awareness, giving our sense of self and the world a
more universal character.16
Thought, then, appears to have this strange, almost magical, ability to
transcend, or dissociate itself, from the local physical situatedness of the
body, from which, so we suppose, it takes root. And so, in so far as the
things that we think about have a causal inuence on our behavior, it would
seem that the factors that actually shape our behavior \overow" the local
processes that constitute the brain, the body, and the immediate environ-
ment. In other words, the causal inuence of thinking on the body seems to
16All of which, I believe, is the true signicance of our folk-psychological conception of
the mind. Contrary to \a mere animal", whose consciousness and behavior is (supposedly)
fully conned and determined by what is \immediately given" { it has a mere momenta-
neous consciousness { human beings are able, thanks to their \higher mental powers", to
seemingly transcend these limitations, and to enjoy a sense of themselves and the world
that is more universal, and to have the freedom to consider alternative realities, and future
possibilities, and to act according to them. Of course, whether this is all true, is a dierent
matter. All in all I think it gives an intuitive picture of how we see ourselves and our place
in the universe.
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imply, essentially, a non-local form of interaction.
But, of course, these may be just appearances. And, perhaps, they better
be. For granting them a reality within the physical world brings with it
various diculties. For one, it appears to require that our behavior is under
the direct inuence of non-local factors. That is, it suggests some sort of
non-local interaction, or action at a distance. And this violates the principle
of locality, so seemingly dear to our rational minds, according to which all
that happens in the world reduces to contiguous physical interactions. One
could also say that the previous story would suggest, perhaps to a somewhat
nave mind, that thoughts are actually instances of extra-sensory perception,
or remote viewing. Ordinary thinking would turn out to be a paranormal
phenomenon! So perhaps our mental lives cannot be what they appear to be
after all: instances of disembodied mind-traveling across space and time.
I suspect that much of the worries that philosophers and other theorists
have about representation stems from a conscious or unconscious awareness
that, somehow, representation requires a non-local, or non-mechanical, sort
of physical interaction. In any case, there seems to be an awareness that, for
some reason or other, there is something problematic about the idea that a
physical system employs representations. As William Ramsey puts it:
The diculties associated with these eorts reveal just how tough
it is to accommodate both our fundamental understanding of rep-
resentation,and our desire to provide a naturalistic account of cog-
nition. Given the central importance of representation through-
out cognitive science, it is no small embarrassment that we are
still unclear on how representations are supposed to operate, as
such, in a biological or mechanical system. (Ramsey; 2007, p.
221)
The fact that so many theorists are enthusiastic about the prospect of giving
an account of cognition in purely \form-sensitive" processes is, I believe,
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indicative of this diculty. For it seems that the only way to make intelligible
how a physical system could operate with representational items, would be
by showing how its representational activity reduces to that good old kind
of mechanical, form-driven, interaction that we suppose to exist between
physical items, and that we all feel to intuitively understand. However,
as the problem of causal potency indicates, it seems that such a reduction
basically obliterates the very need for mental content (why should the brain
be told if it can be forced?). Indeed, this seems to be the prime reason
why some, especially the radical enactivists, have come to propose, by way
of a \can't have" and \don't need" policy with respect to representation, a
non-representational account of cognition.17
I respect the skeptical attitudes that some theorists seem to have about
\o line" mental imagery (which is, sort of, the kind of phenomenon that
I have been referring to). And I understand that people may have certain
reservations about my specic interpretation of it. As a matter of fact, I un-
derstand and agree that appealing to mental imagery is a delicate business.18
Perhaps this is why most non-representationalists are so remarkably hushed
up about mental imagery. Or maybe it is because non-representationalists
think that mental imagery is just a marginal phenomenon, or even an epiphe-
nomenon, with respect to the actual accomplishments of cognition or intel-
ligent behavior. And maybe, just maybe, a kind of dispositional account
of the apparent transparency of thought, something along Dennettian lines,
might turn out to be the most plausible after all, in which case it seems
that we really don't need to worry about representation, or the kind of weird
interaction that representation seems to imply. In that case we can simply
do away with the ontological and metaphysical problems of folk psychology,
and safely say that human behavior is mechanistic through and through.
I am excited to inform that the problem is not that easily dispensed
with. For it seems to me that, in place of mental imagery, there is another
17(Hutto and Myin; 2013, p. 22)
18See e.g. the arguments in (Dennett; 1991)
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fact about our mental lives that, I think, is at least as problematic to a non-
representational account of cognition as mental imagery appears to be. A
phenomenon that is, in certain relevant respects, rather like mental imagery,
but which is a lot more dicult to dispose of as illusory. Hence, much
more dicult to \eliminate". That phenomenon is ordinary, plain, visual
perception.
Vision, it seems to me, is essentially a representational process. Indeed,
the very purpose of vision is to re-present. To use a term of Andy Clark
and Josefa Toribio, vision stills, for the organism, a certain \representa-
tion hunger".19 In making this claim, I am inspired by William Ramsey's
book Representation Reconsidered.20 One of the main points of that book,
is that labeling something as `representational' (as philosophers, neuroscien-
tists, and cognitive scientists often do), requires a special sort of justication;
it requires answering what Ramsey calls the \job description challenge".21
That is, it requires that one shows that the thing that one labels as `represen-
tational', actually has some sort of representational function or purpose. As
Ramsey has convincingly shown, much of what is customarily labeled `repre-
sentational' is not actually deserving of that name. However, although many
other things may fail to t the bill, I believe that it can be easily shown that
vision is, straightforwardly, a process of representation, and hence, deserving
of the name `representational'.
Of course, in addition, the thesis that vision is a representational pro-
cess comes with an important implication; namely that certain current non-
representationalist accounts are inadequate (or at least misleading). More-
over, it appears to me that vision, partly due to its transparent nature, sim-
ilarly appears to resist being given a mechanical interpretation. And this, I
think, is signicant given that non-representationalists are often motivated
by \naturalistic" considerations. Of course, in what follows, I shall try to
clarify all this a bit more. However, my main purpose shall be to show why
19(Clark and Toribio; 1994)
20(Ramsey; 2007)
21(Ramsey; 2007, Ch. 1)
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we should think of vision as essentially a process of representation.
II
The topic of this paper is visual perception; something that has always, in
one way or another, fascinated philosophers. This is because there is much
that is philosophically interesting, and perplexing, about visual perception,
and perception in general. First { and I apologize for the fact that I am
going to digress a bit { there is the bare fact of perception as such; the
fact that perception occurs at all. For whatever else is true, it seems that,
perception, as a natural phenomenon, has a deep metaphysical signicance.
A metaphysical signicance that, I maintain, cannot simply be reduced to,
or eliminated in favor of, something else (e.g., some idiosyncratic biological
interest).
To appreciate why, we need to pause and reect, rst, on that ultimate
riddle that is the truth: the fact that, rather than sheer nothingness, there
is, instead, a strange, seemingly innite, universe. (Which, of course, is the
world that we live in.) And I cannot speak for others, but when I deeply
contemplate this fact, there often arises a special feeling within me. A feeling
of wonder that appears to have a universal and almost impersonal quality to
it. As if the subject of that feeling was existence itself, rather than my own
personal self. But whatever the true nature of that feeling (perhaps I am
just delusional), I believe that we can all recognize that there is something
really quite extraordinary about the fact that there is something, namely the
universe, rather than nothing.
But let me not, here, dwell on this further. My intention in mentioning
this conundrum of ontology is, in the rst place, to say something about the
signicance of perception; the fact that there is perceiving at all.
To be sure, when it comes to the question of why there is something rather
than nothing, the mere existence of a rock would seem as enigmatic as the
existence of a perceptual experience. As Wittgenstein has said \Nicht wie die
12
Welt ist, ist das Mystische, sondern da sie ist".22 Yet despite this, I do think
that, in this respect, there is something rather special about perception. For
it is only when some sort of perceiving takes place that this solitary fact,
this exception of exceptions, namely, the fact that there is something rather
than nothing, actually becomes apparent. To borrow a term from another
German philosopher, only when there is perceiving can there be some sort
of \Seinsverstehen".23 Only through perceiving, or sentience, can the world
make its presence felt. And one is inclined to say that such \understanding
of being" (or the feeling of being) is in fact rather crucial. Perhaps even
essential to the very mystery. For a world that goes altogether unnoticed,
may in fact rather be closer to nothing than to something.24
Thus, it is only through perception that the existence of the world itself
becomes articulate. In a sense, one could say that perception is, quite liter-
ally, the very signicance of existence. After all, in perception there literally
is a \signaling of" existence { of existence and such, and of particular things
that exist. It is only when some sort of perception takes place, that an actual
registration can occur of the peculiar fact that indeed things exist at all. And
since a world whose existence goes altogether unnoticed entirely might, for
all that matters, not be at all, the bare fact of perception seems, in itself,
something of special import.
But what is more, the fact that there is perception at all has, in recent
years, come to acquire an additional philosophical signicance as well. One
that seems altogether dierent from what I have previously said. For under
the assumption that perceptual states { \phenomenal" states { are merely
derivative of more fundamental, non-perceptual \physical" processes, it has
seemed to many that, in fact, there doesn't seem to be a sucient reason
22(Wittgenstein; 1989, p. 150)
23(Heidegger; 1967)
24Really, try to imagine what it would be like for the universe to be, the stars and
planets etc., without there being any entities to perceive it. Although we might be able
to imagine such a world, for that world itself, there really is \nothing it is like" to be!
Indeed, for all that matters to it, it might just as well not be at all!
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why perceptual events are indeed happening within our physical world. I am
of course referring to what David Chalmers has termed the `Hard Problem
of Consciousness'.25 It concerns the puzzle of why perceptual states should
\arise from" or \be identical with" certain physical processes at all, and what
their causal ecacy with respect to the physical consists in (if, indeed, they
have any such ecacy).
So there is an interesting story to be told about the fact that there is
perception at all rather than not. For only through perception is the ex-
istence of the world allowed to become apparent. And so if the fact that
there is something at all rather than nothing can indeed rightfully be re-
garded as the ultimate mystery, it is thanks to perception that this mystery
of mysteries can be regarded at all. But strangely enough, the fact there is
indeed such a consciousness, appears itself, for seemingly dierent reasons,
equally inexplicable! How something conscious could ever come from some-
thing non-conscious, seems as incomprehensible as something coming from
nothing. This, at least, is how I like to think of it. So much for my digression.
I guess there are several reasons why I make all these seemingly unrelated
comments. One reason, I suppose, is that I simply wanted to put some of
my cards on the table. As can be inferred from the way in which I have
framed some things, I think that thinking about perception really is think-
ing about \conscious experience" or \phenomenal consciousness". In other
words, I don't think that there is much sense in thinking about perception
as something that may occur without there actually, in some way or other,
subjectively appearing anything, to something or someone. If there is to be
genuine perception, it must somehow leave its phenomenal trace on the world.
Moreover, I am convinced that we are still pretty much in the dark about
how exactly consciousness might come about in a purely \physical" world.26
Or how, more generally, something conscious intelligibly follows from some-
25See e.g. (Chalmers; 1996), (Chalmers; 1998). See also the collected papers in (Shear;
1997).
26Whatever \physical" really means (Stoljar; 2010).
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thing non-conscious. I guess such mysterianism is not very respectable at the
moment. Nevertheless, I do think that consciousness really is a very strange
and puzzling phenomenon.
But what is more, I don't think that it is a coincidence that, not only
we have diculties with accommodating consciousness within our current
\physicalist" worldview, but that the same kind of diculties also appear
to arise with respect to mental representation. I don't think it is accidental
that both consciousness and representation appear to resist being given a
proper physical interpretation. In fact, it seems to me that, in many respects,
the problems of representation and the problems of consciousness are really
the same. The diculties that arise as soon as we try to get an account
of just how they are to have their impact on the physical world, are good
examples. Indeed, the problem of the causal potency of content is reminiscent
of the issue whether or not \qualia" are epiphenomenal.27 In any case, my
intuition is that the problems of mental representation and consciousness are
intimately linked.
This latter point is important, for it has become custom to separate the
problem of naturalizing \meanings" from the problem of naturalizing \raw
feels".28 But to repeat, I believe that these two facets of our mental lives
are in fact deeply intertwined. I sincerely doubt that we can separate the
problems of representation from the problems of consciousness.29 This is
27See e.g. (Jackson; 1982), and (Chalmers; 1996, Ch. 4 & 5).
28See e.g. (Fodor; 1987, p. 16-18) and (Guzeldere; 1997, p. 22-24).
29See e.g. (Horgan and Tienson; 2002) and (Mendelovici and Bourget; 2014) for similar
views. I guess John Campbell's Reference and Consciousness, in which the thesis is put
forth that the very capacity for reference is essentially grounded in conscious experience,
also provides a good example of this line of thinking (Campbell; 2002). As I come to think
about it, I might as well put a reference to (Harnad; 1990) and (Barsalou; 1999) here as
well. Although, in their writings, these authors are not particularly concerned with the
metaphysical relationship between the phenomenal and the representational (not explicitly
at least), they do seem to recognize the fundamental importance of perceptual content to
cognition. Note, however, that these are all views that mainly aim to ground represen-
tation in consciousness. However, there are also theorists that have argued that it is in
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indicated by the fact that, as soon as we try to apply the notion of mental
representation outside the domain of conscious-level experience, and try to
apply it to more straightforwardly physical things and processes, we seem to
run into all sorts of diculties. At least, this seems to be what many of the
recent discussions of mental representation have now made clear. I shall say
more about this shortly.
First of all, we must note that the very notion of mental representa-
tion is, rst and foremost, derived from our own conscious experience. As
we become aware of our own mental life, from the rst-personal point of
view, and become aware of how conscious thought takes place, we comes
to discover that, apparently, we have an in-built ability to mentally repre-
sent things to ourselves. As Angela Mendelovici and David Bourget note,
representation \...is a phenomenon that we notice in ourselves at the rst
instance...while states that we cannot introspect upon might have inten-
tionality, our reference-xing grip on our target is through introspection"
(Mendelovici and Bourget; 2014).30 So although it may now be common, es-
pecially in the cognitive sciences, to attribute representational properties to
unconscious sub-personal processes, we know representation, rst and fore-
most, as a phenomenon of conscious experience.
fact consciousness that is to be grounded in representation (Dretske; 1995), (Tye; 1995).
According to this view, conscious experience is basically a specic form of representational
processing. Typically, it is committed to the idea that there is such a thing as unconscious
representation. Moreover, from what I reckon, proponents seem to be largely motivated
by the idea that, as computers show, unconscious representation is a fairly non-mysterious
phenomenon. And this seems to invite optimism about the prospect of giving an equally
non-mysterious explanation of consciousness. I shall have to say more about this view
later.
30Although Mendelovici and Bourget are writing about \intentionality", it can be in-
ferred from the article that we can safely substitute here `representation'. As a matter
of fact, the majority of authors in the eld simply equate the concept of intentionality
with the concept of mental representation; to be in an intentional state just is being in a
state of representing some thing or state of aairs, and vice versa. (See also footnote 6 of
(Colombo; 2014).) Mendelovici and Bourget's story about reference-xing can safely be
understood as a story about the initial reference-xation of `mental representation'.
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Of course, from this it does not automatically follow that there can be no
mental representation without consciousness; that the concept cannot nd
some legitimate application outside the domain of conscious experience. As
I have just pointed out, it is very common in cognitive science to posit the
existence of sub-personal mental representations inside the brain that are not
accessible for conscious inspection. However, it seems that the more theorists
have begun to think about what this could possibly mean, the less credible
this view has become. As Daniel Hutto writes:
At root, there must be some genuine way to explain what infor-
mational `content' is and what it is for subpersonal mechanisms
to `communicate' with one another in terms of it... Otherwise
it seems we must accept that talk of the reception, manipu-
lation and production of content at this level is, as McDowell
(1994/1998) noted some time ago, \irreducibly metaphorical" (p.
349). (Hutto; 2013)31
One of the main diculties here, it seems, is that when we look at the kind
of sub-personal processing that the brain is engaged in, all we seem to nd
are just ordinary causal mechanisms. At the physiological (or computational)
level, we see that our senses are stimulated in all sorts of complex ways, and
we see that, in response, the brain engages in all sorts of intricate neurological
processes. But these are fairly ordinary physical interactions. However, in
order for representation to be suciently real, it must actually have some
proper causal role within the system. And the intuition is that, in order for
31To be sure, Hutto is referring here to (McDowell; 1994)/(McDowell; 1998). As a matter
of fact, I think it is worthwhile to let McDowell speak for himself: \The \sub-personal"
account of a sensory system, which treats it as an information processing device that
transmits its informational results to something else inside an animal, cannot adequately
characterize what its sensory systems are for the animal (as opposed to what they are,
metaphorically speaking, for the internal parts that receive the results of the information-
processing): namely, modes of sensitivity or openness to features of the environment"
(McDowell; 1994, p. 197) (my emphasis). It appears that my views and McDowell's are,
in this respect, rather similar.
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representation to have such a causal role, something more is needed than just
ordinary mechanism. As Haselager etal. note:
Importantly, there must be something more than the mere oper-
ation of causal forces in order to warrant talk of representations.
That is, the standing-in, the content, must play a crucial role in
the system's functioning. But specifying exactly what this cru-
cial role of the content is, and how it can be discovered that the
behavior of the system relies on this crucial role of content when
examining a system's causal-physical operations, turns out to be
surprisingly dicult.(Haselager et al.; 2003, p. 19)
It is true that sometimes specic parts of the brain respond in highly ex-
clusive ways to only very particular environmental stimuli. And it is common
to suppose that, therefore, when the brain responds in this way, the brain
is in a representational state of representing that particular environmental
stimulus. However, as has been pointed out, such highly specic correlations
are not sucient for there to be instances of representation.32 In fact, it
seems enough to suppose that, at this level, all there is are simply highly
complex physiological processes that causally mediate, through sheer me-
chanical force, the organism's responses to the environment. There doesn't
seem to be any functional merit in supposing that any of the components
that make up these various causal chains are also representing anything.33
Again, why, at this level, should the brain be \told" or \conveyed" anything,
if all its proceedings already happen through sheer mechanical force any-
way? In order for representation to take place, it seems that something more
is needed. But it is dicult to see what, physiologically speaking, this extra
could be.
To be sure, William Ramsey has somewhat convinced me that there
might, in fact, be a genuine and non-metaphorical way of thinking about sub-
32See e.g. (Ramsey; 2007, Ch. 4), and (Hutto and Myin; 2013, Ch. 4).
33See e.g (Van Gelder; 1995), (Chemero; 2000), and (Chemero; 2009).
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personal (i.e., non-conscious) representation after all.34 Consider a pocket
calculator: a purely mechanical device that is apparently able to be engaged
in intricate mathematical problem solving. According to Ramsey, in order
to make even intelligible how a pocket calculator manages to solve the kind
of problems that it does, one must suppose that things that are internal to
the pocket calculator actually function as a kind symbols. But if it is OK to
attribute symbolic properties to wholly non-conscious things inside a pocket
calculator, then surely a similar thing might perhaps be possible for sub-
personal processes in the brain. Especially so if this gives us a physically
acceptable account of how the brain manages to engage in certain types of
problem-solving.
In this respect, I have also learned from Tim Crane.35 We posses a lot of
propositional knowledge about the world, but we are not all the time con-
sciously entertaining these propositions in our minds. According to Crane,
it is plausible to suppose that this propositional knowledge is nevertheless
somewhere present within us even though we are not consciously aware of
it. So the notion of an unconscious representational item or process appears
not that crazy after all. Also, we might add that, very often, solutions to
problems simply come to us in the form of a conscious thought, making it
appear that the brain was all the time, much like a pocket calculator, sub-
consciously working on the solution { the conscious thought that is nally
\displayed" in our consciousness. (Sometimes we notice that this process
falters: when for example we feel a word on the tip of our tongue, but it nev-
ertheless doesn't manage to get through to us). So perhaps representation
really are sub-consciously present in the brain in the same way as they are
in a pocket calculator.
Let me try, as briey as I can, point out my reservations with respect to
this kind of thinking. First of all, Ramsey's story essentially depends on the
idea that the kind of mathematical problem-solving that a pocket calculator is
34See especially (Ramsey; 2007, Ch. 3).
35(Crane; 1995, Ch. 1)
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engaged in is an intrinsic property of the pocket calculator (Ramsey; 2007, p.
96-102). But I think that this is a misconception: it is only because the pocket
calculator is used by us in a certain way, that its intricate workings become
instances of calculation.36 So I would say that the symbolic properties and
powers of the pocket calculator are ultimately derived from the fact that it is
being used in a certain way by already conscious minds. Therefore, a pocket
calculator is an inappropriate model for understanding how the brain could
host and operate symbolic items at the sub-personal level (unless we want
to say that their status as symbols is also, in a sort of top-down fashion,
derived from a conscious mind). Moreover, as Ramsey himself acknowledges,
the idea that the cognitive architecture of the brain is like that of a digital
computer is loosing support anyway.
This brings me to Crane's point. Very briey: I agree that there must
be some mechanism for propositional memory and the way in which con-
scious thoughts coherently and functionally enter into our conscious aware-
ness. However, why should we suppose that the brain needs unconscious
thoughts to algorithmically \cook up" an appropriate conscious thought?
Indeed, connectionists models may explain how the brain does this without
using prior representations.37 I might add to this that representation is what
representation does. And so perhaps only when they are consciously pro-
cessed can representations do their representational work. At best, we might
say that the kind of things that are supposed to lay dormant within us, and
that explain how propositional knowledge pops-up into conscious awareness,
are instances of proto-representation, rather than instances of actual repre-
sentation.
In any case, it seems to become increasingly clear that the notion of sub-
personal representation (in the materialist-computational sense) has all sorts
of problems. Not only does it seem dicult to come up with an account of
how exactly the designated processes can be operative as representations, the
36Unfortunately, I cannot aord to give my own arguments for this here, but see (Horst;
1999).
37An idea that seems to be suggested in (Ramsey; 2007).
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question is also whether there is even any explanatory utility in supposing
that instances of representations are operative in an organism. However, if
these diculties cause one to be a total skeptic about mental representation,
I believe that one is simply looking in the wrong place. My advice: come to
your senses!. For I take it that, at the level of conscious (visual) experience,
it is, when properly understood, pretty obvious that there is going on a
process of representation { how this can be, is of course, a dierent matter.
(Also, I would say that for explanatory purposes, the supposition that, in
vision, a process of represention takes place, is also in fact quite essential.38)
Fortunately, apart from a few hard-headed skeptics, the majority of theorists
already seem to agree with this.
Furthermore, as I have already pointed out, the very concept of mental
representation is derived, in the rst instance, from our own conscious experi-
ence anyway. So perhaps the various attempts to try to look for it somewhere
else were misguided all along. In any case, whether there actually is or is
not some kind of unconscious, sub-personal, representational processing, we
must, at some point or other, going to take stock of mental representation
as a phenomenon of conscious experience. As far as I can see, that is where
the real magic happens.
This gives me an opportunity to say something about the way my own
thesis should be appreciated within the larger debate. For it seems that,
in the literature on representation, there are in fact two closely related, yet
distinct, issues. And failing to keep them distinct may result in ambiguity
with respect to what exactly it is that is being claimed. Therefore, I think
it is important to put some emphasis on it.
First, there is the issue of whether there is such a thing as mental rep-
resentation at all. That is, it concerns whether or not with respect to the
overall cognitive and behavioral aspects of an organism, some representa-
tional process is taking place. But this should be contrasted with another
issue that theorists seem to have been concerned about. This is the issue
38I shall say more about this in the nal section of this paper.
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of whether these more \global" processes of representation (if, indeed, there
are such) should be explained in terms of other, more primitive processes of
representation.
To illustrate, as William Ramsey points out, it is generally agreed that
cognition is best described \as the conversion of representational inputs into
representational outputs" (Ramsey; 2007, p. 69). So much is, according to
Ramsey, uncontroversial. However, what is, according to him, controversial
is whether this process of conversion also itself breaks down into smaller,
intermediate, representation conversions. An example of a view that arms
the latter, is David Marr's computational theory of vision.39 According to
Marr's theory, the conscious visual percept, which according to this theory
is also itself representational, is in fact constructed out of more primitive,
sub-personal, representations.
The idea here is that underneath the surface of conscious-level experience,
there is all kinds of representational activity going on, from which conscious-
level representation is merely the end product. However, it is surely possible
to maintain that vision as a whole is a representational process, but deny
that this process itself is also in fact accomplished by other representational
processes. Doing so leads to a view that some recently have referred to
as \non-inferential representationalism".40 In other words, one can main-
tain that genuine representation occurs at the level of conscious experience,
without maintaining that there is representation at the sub-personal level.
To conclude, the following comment captures perhaps somewhat more the
general spirit of what I have in mind:
39See e.g. (Poggio; 1981) and (Shapiro; 2011, Ch. 1) for a summary of Marr's theory.
40See (Orlandi; 2014, p. 35). The radical enactivists seem to refer to this view as \max-
imally minimal intellectualism" (Hutto and Myin; 2013, ch. 5 -6). It should be noted that
these \minimal" representational accounts of mentality, including Orlandi's, basically rely
on the idea that phenomenal experience is intrinsically \contentful". However, as I shall
argue later, the representational nature of vision is quite independent of whether or not
phenomenal vision is in and of itself \contentful". So one could go even more \minimal",
and argue that although vision is not \contentfull", it is nevertheless representational. I
think this poses a serious problem for the radical enactivists. But more on this later.
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So, even if in some cases one could view a system as a whole as
representing something, it does not follow that one needs to posit
\stand ins" in the causal explanation of that particular behavior.
If it can be shown that the system's state is best seen as an
emergent property of the overall operation of the system, a non-
representational account seems the most natural way of analyzing
the system. (van Rooij et al.; 2002, p. 351) (emphasis from the
original text)
Although I do not agree with everything that is being said here (I think
that representation is causally relevant in producing behavior), there nev-
ertheless is a lot in this statement that I nd appealing. First of all, there
seems to be in it a recognition of the idea that mental representation will
not be found in any of the physical sub-parts of an organism. Rather, it
is only with respect to the organism as a whole that it makes sense to talk
about representation. This accords well with my own view that mental rep-
resentation happens, rst and foremost, at the level of conscious experience.
For conscious experience is also something that essentially applies to the or-
ganism as whole, at the level where the organism is an actual subject or
individual.41
But what is more, the previous comment speaks of representation as an
emergent property. To be sure, I am not quite sure whether the notion
of emergence is actually a workable concept.42 But if, as it seems, mental
representation suggests a special kind of interaction, something dierent from
(or irreducible to) the kind of contiguous micro-physical interactions that we
are familiar with (as indeed I have hinted at in the previous section, and
which also seems to be recognized by others), then the idea that perhaps
representation is some kind of emergent property with special causal powers,
41To be sure, by \subject" I don't necessarily mean something that is essentially merely
passively undergoing things. Rather, by \subject" I simply mean something of which
certain indexical statements are true.
42See for example (Kim; 2006) for a critical assessment.
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naturally suggests itself. This is especially so, given the supposition that
mental representation is a feature of conscious experience. For consciousness
has also been thought of as an emergent phenomenon.43
But let me go into this later (in the nal section of this paper). For
now, what I want to make clear is that my thesis only concerns vision as a
whole; the process of vision in its entirety. In other words, my claim is that
vision, when taken as a whole, is essentially a process of representation. And
in my mind, this basically means that we should locate the representational
aspects of vision primarily at the level of rst-person conscious experience.
My claim does not include the thesis that vision can also be explained in
terms of further sub-personal processes of representation.
Now, if my claim is merely that vision as a whole is a process of representa-
tion, whereas the really controversial claim is, as Ramsey seems to maintain,
the claim that the totality of vision itself, in fact, further breaks down into
other, more low-level, representational processes, then it might appear that
what I am proposing is really not all that interesting. For it would seem that
what I am claiming is merely what everyone else already thinks anyway.
Yet it seems to me that there certainly are theorists, most notably the
radical enactivists, that do in fact vehemently reject the idea that perception,
vision, is a process of representation.44 In other words, they don't merely
reject the idea that vision is the result of sub-personal transformations of
sub-personal representations. They also reject the idea that vision as such
is a representational process. Indeed, they seem to be rather serious about
this.
In addition, what I mean when I claim that vision is a representational
process, may, in certain respects, be somewhat dierent from what is usually
meant by this. A similar thing goes for the reasons that I have for making
this claim. For example, the fact that vision is representational, in my sense,
43See e.g. (Chalmers; 2006).
44(Hutto and Myin; 2013, Ch. 5-6)
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is quite compatible with the thesis that perception is \direct", and the thesis
that phenomenal experience is not inherently \contentful".45 Indeed, the
reasons for motivating that vision is a process of representation are much
more straightforward. So I do think I have something new and interesting to
bring on the table here.
Some will object that, by changing the meaning of theoretical concepts in
this way, it is easy to make a point and win an argument.46 However, I think
this criticism is only valid when the meaning of an already familiar concept
is changed beyond recognition. Yet I believe that my own use of the concept
of representation is, as a matter of fact, pretty much in accordance with the
way in which, pre-theoretically, we understand its meaning. And as William
Ramsey has pointed out, when it comes to the issue of whether or not one
makes legitimate use of the notion of representation, this is what counts.47
But what is more, I believe that my account of the representational na-
ture of vision also respects very much our intuitions about what it is about
representation that makes it so problematic from a naturalistic point of view.
That is, my account makes clear that, even if vision is \direct" and \con-
tentless", it nevertheless behaves in the exact same problematic way that
you would expect instances of representation to behave. Now, I think that
independent of that, there are also good reasons to refer to the whole pro-
cess of vision as `representational'. But I guess people may dier with me
on this point. The terminological side of the whole issue here is, I believe,
not what ultimately matters. For whether or not one agrees that there is an
appropriate sense in which vision is deserving of the name `representational',
the result is the same. Even if, according to the standard denitions, vision
ought not to be considered representational, we are still left with essentially
45What is usually meant by the proposition that vision is representational, is either
that visual perceiving is \indirect" or that visual perceiving is intrinsically \contentfull".
However, I shall argue that there is an appropriate sense in which vision is representational,
even if vision is \direct" or \contentless". But more on this shortly.
46(Chemero; 2009, p. 66)
47(Ramsey; 2007, Ch. 1)
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the same kind of problems that we would be left with if vision were, in this
more traditional sense, representational. Nothing is solved by denying that
vision is \indirect" or by denying that vision is intrinsically \contentful".
III
The basic idea that I am going to put forward is fairly simple. As I have
already said, my thesis is that vision is essentially a representational pro-
cess. Visual perception serves a representational function within the cogni-
tive and behavioral economy of the (human) organism. Again, to use the
words of Clark and Toribio, vision basically stills, for the organism, a certain
\representation-hunger". But let me now also tell why I think this is so:
vision presents the organism, facilitates the presentation of, things and/or
events that are, in a relevant sense, still absent (or non-present). Vision
makes present, for the organism, what would otherwise still be absent. One
could say that sight really is foresight. Or that viewing is, in a way, re-
ally remote viewing. For vision essentially provides a glimpse into what is
happening somewhere else, or what is likely yet to come. In this way, vi-
sion endows the organism with extra anticipatory power. For reasons that,
hopefully, will become clear, this allows one to say that vision is essentially
a process of representation. And what is perhaps more important; all this is
quite independent from whether or not vision is representational in the more
traditional senses of that term. So let me go into these rst.
When one reads the literature, one nds that the proposition that vision
is representational can in fact mean dierent things. I have already distin-
guished the idea that vision as a whole involves representation, from the
idea that the implementational mechanisms that realize vision are represen-
tational. Here, we are only concerned with the rst of these two ideas. Our
concern is with the idea that actual visual perceiving involve representation.
But this also can mean dierent things. In fact, there commonly appear to
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be, in the literature, two dierent views associated with the proposition that
visual experience is representational. It will be worthwhile to say something
about these two views. Not only because these two views often seem to be
conated, but because it will also make it easier to show that, in fact, there
is a another more direct way to think about vision as a representational
phenomenon.
First of all, the proposition that vision is representational, can denote
the idea that, in visual experience, we are not presented with the external
world itself, but rather with something else { presumably something wholly
mind-dependent { that is a representation of the external world.48 Accord-
ing to this view, our visual awareness of the external world is indirect and
mediated by what we are presented with in visual experience. In other words,
it supposes that there is a kind of \veil of perception" between subjects and
the world. On this account, one could say, our perceptual condition is rather
like seeing the world always only indirectly through a television screen (or if
you will, via the mental screen of a Cartesian Theater).
The view that we are only \indirectly aware" of the \external world"
is a relatively old and familiar idea in philosophy. It has often been re-
ferred to as `indirect realism' or as the `representative theory of perception'.
The philosopher Ned Block has simply referred to is as `representationalism'.
However, he distinguishes it from a more recent view, which he calls `repre-
sentationism', which is the second view that I want to elaborate on.49 As
it happens, however, this view is also often, though somewhat misleadingly,
referred to simply as `representational ism'. Misleadingly, because this view
appears to be, as a matter of fact, radically opposed to the idea that we only
perceive the world indirectly. Indeed, some even refer to it as \the modern
day's direct realism about perception".50
48I suppose a notable example of this view can be found in (Jackson; 1977). More
generally, sense-data theories of perception seem to t the bill here.
49See (Block; 2006). Inuential formulations of representationism include, (Dretske;
1995) and (Tye; 1995).
50See (Aydede; 2014). Michael Tye, a prominent defender of representationalism, has
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From the point of view of representationism, the claim that vision is
representational basically means that in visual experience, the world is rep-
resented as being a certain way. That is, it takes visual experience to be
inherently contentful. In a sense, it supposes that visual phenomenology is
actually akin to a kind of language, to the eect that visual experiences ac-
tually \tell" the subject that, as a matter of fact, such and such is the case.
However, the dierence here (I would say) is that, on this view, it does so in a
communicative medium that is essentially non-symbolical, in the sense that
it presents the content of the message directly, rather than via a symbolic
medium. This view also comes with the idea that experiences have condi-
tions of satisfaction that are actually built into the experience itself. And so
the idea here is that, independent of how we might interpret or \take" them,
phenomenal experiences have, in and of themselves, a certain xed meaning
or \content"; a meaning or content that determines under which conditions
the experience is satised.
To better appreciate what is being said here, it is worthwhile to con-
sider how representationist accounts of hallucination typically dier from
non-representationist accounts; accounts that deny that visual experience is
inherently contentful.51 First of all, both views agree that cases of hallucina-
tion involve some sort of error. Both agree that in hallucination something
that is false is erroneously taken to be true. What representationists and
non-representationists disagree about is the source of the error.
According to representationists, when we hallucinate, the source or the
error lies in the experience itself, or in the phenomenal appearance. That is,
also explicitly denied that there is any such thing as a veil of perception (Tye; 2014).
Strangely enough, most philosophers don't seem to be aware of the confusion that results
in calling this view representationalism. It is comforting to see that at least Block, as well
as some others, are aware of it. See (Robinson; 2008), (Wright; 2008), (Thompson; 2008),
(Aydede; 2014), and (Lehar; 2015).
51See (Travis; 2004) and (Brewer; 2006) for two prominent examples. The radical enac-
tivists also deny that experience is intrinsically contentful (Hutto and Myin; 2013, Ch. 5
& 6).
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the phenomenal features of an experience are themselves directly assessable
for truth or accuracy. One could say that, according to this way of thinking,
each time something phenomenally appears in one's consciousness, some kind
of claim is being made about the world. A special claim, however, in that
it has a certain autonomy relative to our personal-level judgments. In other
words, even if we know on an intellectual level that the pink elephant that
we seem to see is not really there, our perceptual systems may still continue
to proclaim the contrary.
Non-representationists, however, typically claim that the source of the
error is further \upstream", at the level where we make judgments and form
beliefs about our experiences. According to such accounts, experiences simply
are what they are and, therefore, not assessable for truth or accuracy. When
we falsely believe that what visually appears to us is a pink elephant, then,
on this account, it is ultimately we who are to blame, and not our visual
apparatus. At most, our visual apparatus might mislead us into thinking,
falsely, that something is the case. But again, we are to blame; the error
results because we have wrongly interpreted things. The eyes themselves
are, strictly speaking, \dumb". In and of themselves, they don't have any
capacity to tell either truths or lies.
But let's forget about non-representationism, and focus on the dierence
between representationism { the view that phenomenal experience in con-
tentful { and representational ism { the view that we perceive the world only
indirectly. For the dierence between them is rather subtle. As a matter of
fact, I don't think it is even entirely inadequate to say that, in many contem-
porary writings, these two views are often simply treated as one. Indeed, one
sometimes gets the impression that many theorists are not even aware that
there is, in fact, a dierence.52 No doubt this is largely due to the fact that
representionism is often sold under the banner of representational ism, which,
I suppose, most theorists naturally associate with the good old representative
52A notable exception is Christopher Hill (Hill; 2009, Ch. 2). He gives, I think, a very
good account of the conceptual dierences.
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theory of perception. However, there is a dierence. A dierence that might
perhaps be explained in terms of the distinction between content-based and
vehicle-based theories of mental representation.53
According to vehicle-based representationalism, what we are presented
with in experience are actually representational vehicles. According to this
way of thinking, we could think of what appears to us as the phenomenal
analogue of written expressions; a sort of wholly syntactic congurations of
\phenomenal ink" (or \mental paint", as Ned Block calls it).54 On this view,
what appears to us are mere symbolic signs. On the other hand, content-
based representationalism is the view that, in experience, we are actually
directly acquainted with the very content of the representation. Indeed, it
supposes that in experience, the representational vehicles themselves are in
fact transparent (an idea that I have already elaborated on earlier). On this
view, experience is intrinsically language-like, though non-symbolic in the
sense that it conveys its contents directly.55
As far as I understand, one might say that good-old representational ism is
essentially vehicle-based, whereas contemporary representationism is content-
based. As it happens, both views have very dierent metaphysical and on-
tological implications. Let me conclude by mentioning some of them.
First, on a vehicle-based account, phenomenal character is not in and
of itself \world revealing". It doesn't necessarily show us, in and of itself,
what the world is actually like, qualitatively speaking. Because it conceives
of phenomenal appearances in vehicular, and thus symbolic terms, it leaves
open the precise nature of the relationship between what experience is like,
and what the world is like. In fact, even if the world appears to us as it
actually is, this would be, on this view, merely accidental. An analogy:
although a painting may resemble the thing or situation that it represents, it
is not essential for a painting to resemble what it represents. One could make
53I borrow these terms from Brad Thompson (Thompson; 2008).
54See (Block; 2003).
55Some would say that it is also a language that is essentially non-conceptual. See e.g.
(Tye; 1995).
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an abstract or non-gurative work of art that represents the exact same thing
or situation. Thus, from a vehicle-based perspective, the relation between
the phenomenal character of experience and the character of the world, is
just as loose as the relation between the character of a symbol and that which
the symbol symbolizes.56
Not so with content-based accounts. For on such accounts, phenomenal
character is essentially world-revealing. On this view, phenomenal charac-
ters directly specify what the world is actually like. Moreover, it denies that
experience is picture-like, in the sense that, for it, the \qualitative correspon-
dence" that exists between the phenomenal character of experience and the
world (at least in the veridical cases) is not, in the rst instance, grounded
in resemblance. Instead, phenomenal character is supposed to represent in-
trinsically or directly. For note that, whether or not something resembles
something else is not an intrinsic property of that thing. At the very least, it
seems that there is always some sense in which it is appropriate to say that
everything resembles everything else, whereas there is also always a certain
sense in which it is quite appropriate to say that, in fact, nothing ever resem-
bles anything else. According to a content-based interpretation of experience,
however, the nature of phenomenal experience is such, that it represents in
a way that ambiguity, or indeterminacy, does not enter. Again, the idea is
that experience represents directly; it supposes that experience represents in
a content-based manner.
Finally, content-based and vehicle-based accounts dier with respect to
their ontological implications. From a vehicle-based perspective, what ap-
pears must, in some sense, actually exist. A principle which has come to
56To be sure, we might point out that, even if we suppose that phenomenal character
is not in and of itself world-revealing, and suppose that all that features in experiences
are various phenomeno-syntactic congurations, we might still allow that there can never-
theless (and, for functional reasons, probably must) be a kind of structural isomorphism
between the phenomenal structure of experience and the structure of the world, especially
if there are many ne-grained correlations between the two.
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be known as the `phenomenal principle'.57 However, from within a content-
based perspective, this is usually denied. In eect, representationalists and
representationists both give very dierent accounts of what happens in cases
of illusion and hallucination.
To illustrate, from a vehicle-based point of view, our experience is rather
like reading the newspaper. Although it may be full of lies, it is still the case
that the symbolic expressions themselves really exist in the way they appear.
(At least, from the fact that the newspaper is full of lies, it doesn't follow
that the newspaper itself, with its various claims, does not, as such, exist.)
This is dierent with a content-based account. On a content-based account,
experiencing is more like believing, in the sense that, just as one can believe
that p, one can experience that p. However, just as it doesn't follow from the
fact that one believes that p that p is also true, neither does experiencing
that p imply p. Thus, the fact that one experiences a red color somewhere
in one's visual eld does not imply that there actually is a red color.58
These, then, are the two most common views associated with the idea that
vision is a representational process. To be sure, I have reconstructed these
views in such a way that they are maximally distinct. However, there cer-
tainly seem to be mixed versions out there { i.e., accounts that suppose that
the phenomenal character of experience is both characterized by vehicular
and contentful aspects.59 Moreover, it may very well be that representa-
tionalists and representationists disagree with the way in which I have re-
constructed their views. Yet I think that, given our conceptual space, the
content-based/vehicle-based distinction is a neat tool to distinguish between
two very dierent ways to apply the concept of representation to vision. Also,
dividing theoretical space in this way, is the only way I can think of to make
sense of the claim that contemporary representationism a la Tye and Dretske
57See (Robinson; 1994), and (Fish; 2010).
58Whether this also makes sense is, of course, a dierent matter. See (Robinson; 2008)
and (Thompson; 2008) for critical assessments.
59I count as examples (Peacocke; 1983), (Block; 2003), and (Shoemaker; 2003).
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is not just a version of the traditional representative theory of perception.
(To be honest, at times, I am still at a loss as to what exactly the view
is supposed to amount to.) But what is more, my point is that vision can
be regarded as worthy of the name `representational', even though it may
neither be indirect nor intrinsically contentful. Indeed, it seems to me that
vision's status as a representational process is quite independent of this.
However, in order to appreciate this, I think it is important that we ap-
proach vision phenomenologically, rather than that we make the mistake of
focusing exclusively on the \underlying" physiological mechanisms of vision.
Of course, this has everything to do with my conviction that the representa-
tional features of vision are located at the level of conscious experience. In
other words, we must consider what visual perceiving is actually like. This
is not something that is easily revealed simply by looking at what goes on
at the physiological level of description. Indeed, the picture that the phys-
iological story suggests seems, as a matter of fact, even somewhat opposed
to what is suggested to us phenomenologically. (Which seems part of the
reason why, if we only look at it physiologically, we tend to become anti-
representationalists.) But let me come back to this later.
Consider what it is actually like to see. An answer that readily springs to
mind is that vision characteristically consists in the perception of shape and
color. However, it seems to me that there is another important characteristic
of vision; a feature that is deeply puzzling, and yet often paid too little
attention to in philosophical discussions; it concerns the fact that, in vision,
we are presented with objects and states of aairs that have their being a
certain distance away form us. It concerns the fact that there appears to be
a spatial gap between the seer and what it seen.
Stretch out your arm, and look at your hand. Does not your hand make
its appearance, and does it not seem as though it does so from a location that
is a certain distance away from you? In other words, although one's seeing
of the hand seems to happen \over here", the hand that is seen, the object
seen, nevertheless makes its appearance \over there". Yet strangely enough,
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\over here" seems to be directly aware of \over there". And this seems to
happen without \over here" needing to go \over there", and without \over
there" needing to come \over here" (after all, wouldn't we otherwise see much
more details?). In other words, one appears to see the distant object directly.
However, in doing so, we ourselves and the object nevertheless maintain our
distance. Neither the seer, nor the seen, crosses the gap that exists in between
(hence the gap). And so indeed, given the phenomenology of vision, one is
inclined to say that visual perceiving must involve some sort of \spooky"
action at a distance.
Now if we take this phenomenon seriously, as I think we should, then
I think that already in and of itself, it provides sucient reason to regard
vision as a process of representation. Even if visual perception is neither
indirect nor contentful. In fact, in what follows I shall assume that vision
actually is direct and intrinsically contentless.
What does it mean for something to represent? Really, what is representa-
tion? To be sure, there might not be any one set of sucient and necessary
conditions that dene the nature of representation.60 Indeed, according to
some, representation really is a \cluster concept".61 However, this does not
mean that whether or not something falls under this cluster is an empty
question. It does mean that whether something is an instance of representa-
tion depends on one's concept of representation. But although there might
be more than one legitimate way of using the term `representation', it does
not follow that, in this respect, anything goes. As William Ramsey has con-
vincingly shown, there certainly are proper and improper ways of using the
concept of representation.62
As I have already briey mentioned, in the neurosciences and in cog-
nitive science, it is common to regard certain patterns of brain activity as
forms of mental representation, because there exists a systematic correlation
60(Stich; 1992)
61(Ramsey; 2007, Ch. 1.1)
62(Ramsey; 2007)
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between these patterns of activity and certain features of the environment.
The common assumption is that such patterns represent these environmen-
tal features. But as others have pointed out, the fact that a specic form
of neuronal activity takes place exclusively in response to some particular
environmental stimulant, is not sucient (and, it would seem, neither neces-
sary) for that neuronal activity to represent that environmental stimulant.63
In other words, the fact that the presence of a pink elephant elicits a specic
type of neuronal activity in V1 does not, in and of itself, suce for that pat-
tern to represent a pink elephant. Something more substantial is required
for something to be an instance of representation.
But what? Again, Ramsey has useful things to say. According to him,
there are basically two ways in which such a neuronal pattern of activity
can in fact turn out to be an instance of representation. One of these I
have already briey mentioned, and that is that the neuronal pattern in
fact instantiates (part of) a process of formal symbol manipulation. The
second way is for the neuronal pattern of activity to have a certain structural
resemblance to the thing or state of aairs that it represents, a structural
resemblance that must, moreover, as such be used by the cognitive system,
and which must also be used because it bears this resemblance to the thing
or state of aairs in question. Ramsey refers to these as \io-representation"
and \s-representation" respectively.64
Although Ramsey has his reasons for distinguishing between these two
forms of representation, in my mind, they essentially come down to the same
principle.65 This is because the very reason that processes of formal symbol
manipulation work, is precisely because the symbols, and the system of syn-
tactic operations that may be performed on them, bear a certain structural
63See (Ramsey; 2007, Ch. 4) for an extensive treatment. The radical enactivists refer to
this as the \Covariation Doesn't Constitute Content Principle" (Hutto and Myin; 2013,
p. 67).
64See (Ramsey; 2007, Ch. 3) { \io" stands for `input-output' and \s" stands for `simu-
lation'.
65(Ramsey; 2007, p. 102-104)
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resemblance or \isomorphy" to the domain that is symbolized. Conversely,
one could argue that any instance in which x's structural resemblance to
y is exploited to nd out things about y (the basic idea of simulation) is
a kind of computational process that involves some form of formal symbol
manipulation. In other words, formal symbol manipulation (provided that
the symbols and the manipulations have been given some interpretation) re-
ally is a form of simulation, and simulation is really a kind of formal symbol
manipulation.
The idea that representation involves a kind of modeling accords well
with a widely shared idea about what it means for something to represent
something else. Namely, the familiar idea that representations essentially
\stand in" for the things that they represent. What the previous story tells
us is how something becomes able to function as a stand-in for something
else. Because of certain similarities that a representation y bears to a certain
thing x, y can be used as a substitute for x to nd out things about x. For in
so far as certain truths about a representation follow from the conguration
of properties that it also shares with the very thing that it stands for, those
truths will automatically apply to that thing as well. So things can be used as
stand-ins for something else, because they bear a specic kind of resemblance
to those things.
Now, as I have already tried to make clear, my own thesis is not about
the representational status of certain patterns of neuronal activity. Instead,
my concern is with the representational status of conscious visual experience.
Of course, it may turn out that conscious experience is, as a matter of fact,
identical with those very patterns of neuronal activity. In any case, it is at
least likely that certain neurons play a functional role with respect to our
visual system. However, given that we are assuming that vision is direct, it
seems that, in some way or other, the environment itself must actually be a
constituent of the overall visual experience, in which case the neurons alone
will not give us the complete story.66
66I am aware that there is a diculty in the idea that something non-local to oneself is
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Besides, in arguing that vision is representational, I want to appeal pri-
marily to the phenomenology of vision. For it is primarily what vision is like
experientially, that provides the strongest grounds for the supposition that
it involves representation. Again, the representational features of vision pri-
marily become apparent at the level of conscious experience. So it seems that
questions about neuronal activity are not immediately relevant here anyway
(which, I guess, should already be apparent from many of the things I have
said before). In order, then, to determine whether vision is appropriately to
be described as a representational process, we must decide whether vision is a
kind of modeling activity. Or alternatively, whether vision is in the business
of facilitating some sort of stand-in(s).
Of course, what immediately comes to mind here, is the idea that what we
experience during visual perception, is really an internally generated mental
model of the world. A model that is then used to reason about the world, or
to nd one's way in it. This would seem to be a version of the representative
theory of perception. It also suggests that, whether or not vision facilitates
stand-ins, depends on whether or not vision involves the generation of an
internal mental model. Again however, I think that, in fact, the representa-
tional nature of vision does not primarily depend on it being indirect. Even
though it may be true that in visual perception, what we directly see, is the
external world itself, this does not mean that what we thus see may not in
fact, in so far as it is seen, serve as a kind of stand-in. And as I hope to show,
I think that part of the very purpose of the scenery that is made available
actually a constituent of one's experiential state. Moreover, the possibility that one could
be in a hallucinatory state that is indistinguishable from \normal" experience suggests
that, in fact, external properties and objects themselves never actually feature in our
experience. In response to this latter problem, one could maybe oer some disjunctivist
account such as can be found in (Snowdon; 1980) and (McDowell; 1986). But to be honest,
I am not really a fan of disjunctivism. However, I am a fan of the idea that I actually see
the outside world itself. And it appears that parts of that world are a certain distance
away from me. And so something non-local actually appears in my experience, and is
therefore a part of it. How that is possible, I don't know. But it does seem to be very real.
It is something that I nd deeply puzzling; which is why I nd it so incredibly interesting.
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through the process of vision is precisely to function as a kind of stand-in.
However, in order to appreciate this, it will help to rst ask about the
purpose of a stand-in. In other words; what is the purpose of using a stand-
in rather than the thing itself? No doubt, dierent answers can be given
here. But one important advantage of using a stand-in, I guess, is that it
allows for a kind of hypothetical knowledge; a knowledge that is, in a sense,
independent of actual fact. For example, oftentimes, we are interested in how
some x will behave or react under certain specic conditions. The advantage
of using a model, or stand-in, is that you can nd out about this, without
actually having to put x in the required conditions. Instead, one can use a
model that, because it bears a certain similarity to x, will behave or react
in those conditions exactly like x. And we might prefer this for various
reasons. Perhaps, for example, we don't want to cause any serious damage
to x (or to ourselves). Or maybe we don't want to cause any permanent
change to x. More generally, perhaps we simply don't know enough about
x to freely experiment with it, and so we use a model to prevent irreversible
and unwanted consequences. So using a stand-in is a less binding (or less
denite) way of nding out things about x (or, for that matter, the world in
general).
Another reason why one might want to use a stand-in, might be that the
thing itself is simply not available, or absent (which is, of course, an important
component in Clark and Toribio's notion of a representation-hungry task).
One could say that this is one of the primary reasons why, in mathematics,
there is so much use of symbols. After all, due to their abstract nature, it
seems that we can never actually experiment with the numbers themselves,
but must perform manipulations on symbols instead.67 But of course, things
67This is also what makes the claim that a pocket calculator is engaged in mathematics
somewhat more intelligible. An initial worry about this claim might be that it is dicult
to see how a calculator device, a physical thing located at a point in space and time, can
actually interact with entities that, supposedly, exist entirely outside of space and time.
However, when we realize that all that the pocket calculator actually does is shuing
symbols of mathematical entities { whose symbolic status is, moreover, I claim, conferred
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can also be absent simply because they are too far away spatially, or because,
temporally, they have already happened, or have not happened yet. When we
want to reason about things that are absent in these various ways, the use
of a stand-in is a very powerful and, it would seem, indispensable tool. This
is especially so when we want to reason about things and events that are
currently spatially absent, or things and events that are going to happen in
the future. For in these cases, it is clear that the use of a stand-in facilitates
the user with predictive and, therefore, anticipatory power.
I believe this story about representation can be applied straightforwardly to
vision. First of all, intuitively, there is a clear sense in which visual perceiving
provides us with a kind of anticipatory power. Simply put: thanks to vision
we basically are able to avoid crashing into things. (Of course, this is not all
that vision does, but it seems to be at least one of its functions.) However,
and this is important, vision does this through essentially representational
means. In vision there is a kind of widening of our spatiotemporal horizon.
What once was unavailable or absent to us, is now, thanks to vision, (quasi-
)available or (quasi-)present. Through vision, spatially distant things are
allowed to enter immediately into our conscious awareness, thereby allowing
us to \reckon with" (or at least respond to) variables that would otherwise
not have \entered into the equation". Thanks to our vision, what was once
absent, now is made present (or \quasi-present"). As we see, the extensive-
ness of the world itself comes into view. And with that, our own world is
enlarged as well. As a consequence, we gain certain special capacities for
anticipation. (Or if you want, a certain freedom.)
Of course, this has everything to do with the apparent action at a distance
that is suggested by our visual phenomenology. But what, then, is it that
makes all of this also deserving of the name `representational'? Well, one
could say that vision basically allows us, not simply to see, but to fore-see.
upon them by human beings { we come to see how it is actually possible for a pocket
calculator to be, in some sense, engaged in mathematics.
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Or alternatively, one could say that viewing really is remote viewing. In
other words, without actually having to go there, we can already know, from
a distance, that something is present over there. Rather than having to go
into the trouble of nding out about the thing's presence \the hard way"
(by crashing into it, or by being eaten by it), vision facilitates a kind of
\pre-monition" of the thing's presence \in-stead". And, of course, this is
precisely why vision allows us to anticipate things. To put it a bit more
metaphorically, through the process of seeing, we become cognizant of \the
future that lies ahead".
Now, an objection to this idea might go as follows: the scenery that
becomes available thanks to our visual apparatus cannot really be regarded
as a stand-in, because the scenery is simply the world itself, rather than any
substitute for it. (At least this is what we are supposing right now, viz.,
that vision is direct.) In other words, suppose one is walking through the
African jungle, and one sees several 100 meters away a dangerous predator.
In that case, we in fact see the predator itself rather than any predator-
substitute. Therefore, the predator is not really absent after all. And so
there doesn't in fact seem to be any need for a stand-in. And thus it is
dubious to suppose that visual perception is a process for the purpose of
facilitating stand-ins. And therefore, one might object that vision is not
really a process of representation after all. At most, vision is a process of
pre-sentation.
I think we should disagree with this. First, note that absence is, in this
context, a relative predicate. Although it is correct to say that the predator
is not absent in the sense that it is absolutely non-existent, we are interested
here in whether the predator is absent for something else. To be sure, what
it means for something to be absent for something else may also admit of
dierent degrees and/or interpretations. However, I think that there is a
clear sense in which the things that we see at a distance are, relative to
ourselves, absent. At least, if it weren't for vision. We naturally say that
things at the other side of the earth are, relative to us, absent. But suppose
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we would have the ability to see around the surface of the earth, all the way
to the other side. Would it then become appropriate to say that things and
events at the other side of the planet are really present to us? I don't think
so. Similarly for the things we see at more ordinary distances. Those things
really are, in the relevant sense, absent. It is only because we are endowed
with a visual sense that their non-local presence becomes available to us.
Indeed, it is important to realize that the world that we see does not just
hang in thin air. Rather, the fact that things visually appear at all, is the
result of a process. A process, we might add, with a certain purpose. And,
indeed, perhaps we should also add here that `representation' is not so much a
noun as it is a verb! The whole process of visual perception, is simultaneously
a process of making present. A process of making distant things available for
the organism, so that non-local things and events can directly enter into the
factors that determine its behavior, thereby giving the organism the power of
anticipation. Through the process of vision, something that is already present
somewhere else, is now also, \over here", made present for the organism. And
so it is indeed appropriate to speak in terms of a process of \re-presentation".
Moreover, this is also why we may regard the world, in so far it is seen
by us, as functioning as a kind of stand-in or surrogate. For although we
directly see the world outside of us, the fact that the world itself appears in
this way at all, is directly dependent on a process of vision. But the very
process of vision precisely functions as a kind of substitute for the fact that
certain things are, in the relevant sense, absent for the organism. However,
what denes the process of vision as a substitute, is basically the fact that
it make (quasi-)available a world of distant things and states of aairs. A
world that, in so far as it is made available, is indeed inseparable from this
process. Only to the extent that vision makes this world available does it
function as a kind of substitute process. Therefore, the world as seen can
itself be regarded as serving a substitute role. Even though what is thus seen
is the external world itself. Simply put; because there is a certain lack, the
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process of vision basically makes available, a world seen in-stead.68
Finally, we might add that, in visual experience, there is a clear, and
indeed fundamental, sense in which some kind of reference is taking place.69
As things appear to us in the distance, reference is being made to things
that essentially exist beyond ourselves someplace else. Indeed, this power to
refer seems to be intrinsic to the visual experience.70 But of course, reference
is an important characteristic of many, more uncontroversial, instances of
representation; language being a primary example. As a matter of fact,
what makes linguistic expressions representational is precisely the way in
which they refer to other things. Linguistic expressions typically refer to
things beyond themselves, often to things and places that are spatially and
temporally distant. In this way, linguistic expressions make us aware of,
or make present to our minds, things and events that would otherwise be
absent to us. And this is the reason why it is appropriate to call them
`re-presentational'. Similarly, one could say, it is precisely because in vision
there is a reference to distant things and places that, for similar reasons, it
essentially constitutes a process of representation.
So the general idea goes something like this. First, representations typically
gure as a kind of substitute for something else. And they do so, because
they bear a specic similarity to the things and/or states of aairs that they
represent. One important feature of using a stand-in in this way, is that, in
specic contexts, it allows for a kind of anticipation. Now, in vision, we are
provided with a clear example of anticipation by means of representation.
For what vision does, is allowing non-local things to directly \enter into the
equation" of our behavior. By making us become directly aware of distant
68This proposal is perhaps a bit similar in spirit to other theories of cognition that try
to locate the representational-vehicles in the body and the world, rather than exclusively
inside the brain (Clark and Chalmers; 1998), (Noe; 2006).
69See also (Campbell; 2002).
70Something that has, for some strange reason, escaped certain prominent skeptics of
\original intentionality" (Dennett and Haugeland; 1987), (Dennett; 1987, Ch. 8).
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things, vision makes present what otherwise would still be absent. This pro-
cess of vision, in which non-local things are made (quasi-)present, essentially
acts as a substitute for what is, relative to the organism, still missing. This
is what gives vision its representational nature. (And in order to add some
more intuitive force to this, we might also add that in vision, it seems essen-
tial that some sort of reference is taking place. A reference thanks to which
distant places are allowed to come to our minds.)
To be sure, with respect to the points that I have made, I may only have
scratched the surface of things. On the other hand, I believe that the basic
idea is, really, very simple and straightforward. So perhaps there simply is,
at this point, not much more to say about it. In any case, I think that the
idea is clear, and indeed, quite robust. In many respects, it is clear that
vision just is becoming aware, in a certain colorful and shapy way, of distant
things. It would be dicult, to say the least, to believe that this is merely an
accidental property, or side-eect, of the process of vision. Indeed, it seems
more plausible to suppose that the quasi-presence of spatially distant things
is among the very purposes of vision.
But what is perhaps more important, is that all that has been said so far
about the representational status of vision neither, as far as I can see, requires
that vision is indirect in the way the representative theory of perception
supposes, nor requires that vision is intrinsically contentful in the way that
representationism supposes. In other words, vision can be representational,
even though it is direct and intrinsically contentless.
To be fair, I haven't, in this respect, said anything yet about the dis-
pensability of content. I have only tried to show that in order for vision
to be representational, it is not necessary that visual perceiving is indirect.
However, I think that it is fairly easy to show that my arguments for the
representational nature of vision are neither dependent on the supposition
that visual experience is intrinsically contentful. This is because all the rep-
resentational work is done solely by the fact that, through the process of
vision, distant things get to make their appearance to us, so as to directly
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enter into the behavioral equation. But the fact that things thus appear at
a distance does not require that those things are also represented as distant.
What matters is that what appears to us is, in fact, distant, and has, as
such, an impact on us.
Let me try to briey explain my point. First, if we agree that the intrinsic
contentfulness of experience is indeed a substantial issue, then we must also
agree that although it might be true that, on a certain occasion, one is
actually looking at, say, the Taj Mahal, it is a further question whether or
not the thing that one is thus visually presented with is also presented as
the Taj Mahal. In other words, those who suppose that visual perceiving
is contentless, can still coherently maintain that what appears in experience
are actual chunks of the environment.71 They simply deny that being thus
presented with the environment constitutes, in and of itself, a contentful
claim about the environment. And so it is possible that, in some cases, one
of those chunks is identical to, or a part of, the Taj Mahal, without it being
the case that, phenomenally speaking, anything is represented as the Taj
Mahal. Similarly, although one might actually be looking at a painting of
Vermeer, it is a further question whether one's visual experience also presents
the painting as a painting of Vermeer. And so nally, it is possible to be
presented with something that is spatially distant, without it being the case
that one's phenomenal experience contentfully represents it as distant.
But to the extent that we perceive distant things, a process of representa-
tion, by denition, takes place! Or at least, this is what I have tried to argue.
For to make things that are present somewhere else also (quasi-)present \over
here" just is to re-present. In other words, vision is representational, because
it facilitates an awareness of spatially distant things, not because it is in the
business of constructing a representation that proclaims that such and such
71Of course, it is also possible to suppose that perception is contentless and deny that the
phenomenal aspects that are given in it are identical to parts of the external environment.
In this way, one might end up with various views. For example, both some version of
vehicle-based representationalism or an adverbial theory of phenomenal experience ((Fish;
2010, Ch. 3)) seem to be possibilities in this respect.
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is over there in the distance. And one might add that although, plausibly,
the function of this process of representation is to make distant things be-
come, in a certain way, causally relevant to the behavior of the organism;
for this, also no content is required. Indeed, this causal relevance seems to
be realized as soon as distant things actually start to gure in our sensory
experience. For as soon as they do so, they, by denition, are making an
impact on us. And plausibly, we are wired in such a way that, in those
circumstance, we are automatically moved to respond in appropriate ways.
Indeed, it may very well be that our responses to distant things are entirely
\dumb",\instinctive", and \unreective". What matters is that what we re-
spond to are distant things, and that the sense of vision facilitates that such
responding is even possible.
In any case, I hope that my point is clear: the kind of representational
activity that vision is engaged in, is not only not dependent on whether or
not vision is indirect, it is neither dependent on whether visual perceiving
is contentful. We only need to consider vision in its bare naked form, to
nd that these issues have little to do with the representational activity that
seems so characteristic of vision.
IV
I believe that I have succeeded in showing that there is a straightforward
sense in which vision is a process of representation. And so I have reached
the main goal of this paper. However, one might object that, although there
may be some sense in which it is appropriate to refer to vision as a process
of `representation', the sort of representation that one ends up with is not of
a very interesting kind. Not very interesting, precisely because it does not
involve the claim that we only perceive the world indirectly, nor the claim
that perceptual experience is contentful. And it is indirect perception, and
even more so, mental content, that philosophers have been worrying about.
Recent `non-representationalist' theories, most notably radical enactivism,
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are primarily concerned with showing the dispensability of content. And
so it would seem that my arguments for the thesis that vision is repre-
sentational, do not actually show that non-representational theories are, in
any substantial way, inadequate. After all, it would seem that these `non-
representationalist' frameworks are reacting against a notion of representa-
tion that is essentially dierent from mine. Thus, someone might point out:
\If you twist long enough the meanings of our concept of representation and
vision then, surely, you will nd some way to connect the two. However, it
seems that all you have accomplished this way is a mere terminological vic-
tory, not something that is of any substantial relevance to the current debate
on representation. After all, you have not actually established the funda-
mental importance of `mental representation' in the truly relevant sense of
that term. Your arguments are beside the point!"
I beg to dier. If vision is indeed as I have described it, then it seems
that we still have to face certain important problems. Problems that are
essentially the same as the those that come up with the more traditional
conceptions of mental representation. For example, although it might seem
that eliminating mental content saves us from the problem of how any such
items as mental contents can have a true causal impact on the world, a
problem that is essentially similar remains.
As I have pointed out in the opening section of this paper, there appears
to be, on the classical cognitivist account, a certain tension between the idea
that the brain is merely a syntax-sensitive processor, and the phenomeno-
logical observation that our mental states appear to be transparent to us in
such a way that we seem to be able to directly intuit the very contents of our
thoughts. The tension here arises from the apparent fact that, contrary to
what the materialist-computational view implies, mental content does seem
to be directly involved in shaping how we think and behave. At the very
least, if it is true that we are merely syntax-sensitive machines, then it sure
seems strange that this illusion of transparency is nevertheless there.
It would seem that disposing of content as a mere illusion would solve
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the tension here. If phenomenal states are not intrinsically contentful, then
we need not worry about the causal ecacy of content. However, even if we
drain phenomenal states from all content, it seems right to say that those
states nevertheless retain their transparent nature.72 Especially so in the
case of vision. For, even though its phenomenal deliverances do not involve
any contentful claiming, this does not make it any less true that in vision
we primarily look out into the world. We do not in a similar way \see"
the internal state that brings about this looking out. When we try to intro-
spect the visual experience itself, it seems that there is nothing there that
is phenomenally manifest, other than the world itself that is already beyond
our skins. Disposing of content doesn't really change much about this. But
the kind of transparency that one thus ends up with is equally puzzling and
problematic.
For the puzzling part, consider what the philosopher Howard Robinson
has to say about what he refers to as \...one of the basic problems of percep-
tion"73:
On the one hand, a little reection { that is, thought that does
not resort to any science that goes beyond common experience
{ shows that perception involves some sort of physical inuence
running from the external object to the sense organ of the per-
ceiver. On the other hand, the essential nature of experience
seems to be that the subject mentally reaches out to, and makes
conscious contact with, the external object. The directionality
of the physical process and that of the lived experience seem to
be in direct conict. How can a process in which the subject is
the passive recipient of a stimulus be the physical aspect or re-
alisation of a process in which the subject reaches actively and
consciously out into the world? (Robinson; 1994, p. 4)
I don't think that I could have formulated it better myself. There is some-
72See also (Kennedy; 2009) for a somewhat related conclusion.
73See (Robinson; 1994, p. 4).
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thing counter-intuitive about the physical \inwardness" of the physical stim-
ulus and the outward direction of our mental regard as we see something in
the distance. And this is mainly because we suppose that the two are in fact
two dierent aspects of one and the same process.74 How is it that the kind
of visual processing that happens inside of us when incoming electrochemi-
cal signals excite our retina's, contains within itself a reference outwards to
something that is located far beyond this processing?
To be sure, what we have here is not mere counter-intuition and puzzle-
ment. I believe that if we truly think about what appears to be going on
here, we come to see that there are some very real problems to be dealt with.
Of course, what we are immediately reminded of here, is the hard problem
of consciousness. How do we account for the fact that we consciously expe-
rience ourselves and the world, in terms of (physical) processes that are not
themselves conscious? How do you get something conscious from something
non-conscious? As I have already confessed, I don't think that we have the
answer to this yet. However, the problem here is not simply why it is that
our internal states are \charged" with a \phenomenal glow"; the problem is
deeper. The phenomenology of vision also seems to violate our basic causal
and geometrical intuitions about the physical world.
It is not the mere phenomenal side (in the technical sense of that term)
of vision that is problematic, but also the fact that, on the face of it, vision
appears to allow non-local factors to directly enter into the set of variables
that shape our thinking and doing. The diculty here is not just how to
accommodate a place for the phenomenal in the physical; it is also very
much a problem of how to reconcile problematic forms of interaction with
our current physicalist metaphysics.
On the face of it, vision seems to involve instantaneous action at a dis-
tance. As we see things at various distances, an immediate interaction be-
74We are a bit reminded here of the so-called \wagon-wheel eect", a perceptual illusion
in which a wheel appears to rotate contrary to the direction in which it actually rotates.
Of course, whether visual phenomenology is equally illusory remains to be seen.
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tween two distant things appears to take place. A kind of interaction that
essentially appears to be non-local. However, given our general understand-
ing of the physical world, we feel that such kinds of interaction ought not
to be possible. At least, I think it is fairly uncontroversial that most of our
physicalist theorizing proceeds on the assumption that all interaction must
ultimately resolve itself in contiguous micro-physical causal interactions.75
Therefore, visual phenomenology appears to contradict what we suppose the
physical world is like. And of course, from a \physicalistic" or \naturalistic"
point of view, this is bad news (unless we are willing to suppose that the
natural contains in fact more than we thought it did).
Given that we are here, apparently, confronted with a contradiction in our
conceptions about what the world is like, there are several ways to respond.
And given the metaphysical climate of our times, it seems that the most
obvious response is try to show that the phenomenological data are in fact
merely apparent. However, it seems that there are then two further options.
One can either go for a reductionistic approach, and try to show that our
awareness of the distant object is in fact wholly reducible, without remainder,
to local physical interactions at a lower ontological level, or one can adopt
an eliminativist strategy, and try to show that the phenomenological data
are illusory, such that we are not actually aware of any distant entities or
states of aairs. So the reductionist strategy is to accept that we are aware of
75I am aware of the debates among theoretical physicists, and philosophers of physics,
about the question of whether the `principle of locality' { according to which physical
things and processes can only be inuenced by their immediate surroundings { is actually
true of our world (Berkovitz; 2014). But I am going to skip that diculty for now, since,
much to my regret, I don't know enough about physics. I think it is safe to say that the
principle of locality is an implicit assumption in much of the physicalist literature (The
Philosopher C.D. Broad, for example, has referred to it as one of the \Basic Limiting
Principles" (Broad; 1949). See also (Grin; 1993).) At the very least, I think it is fair to
say that, when it comes to the direct causal determinants of human behavior, the default
position among naturalistically-minded theorists, is that only things that are internal to
us, or physical forces that directly impinge on our bodily surfaces, are direct causes of our
behavior.
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something in the distance, but to deny that it involves any actual unmediated
action at a distance. The eliminativist strategy, on the other hand, is to
deny the phenomenological data altogether, and thereby simply to forestall
the need to account for the alleged anomalies. Unfortunately, I think that
both options are problematic.
In what follows I would like to go into this a bit. However, what I am
going to say will be rather schematic, since, at this point, it is not possible
to delve into new problems in any sucient detail. The main reason that I
want to touch upon these issues is that, as we have seen, some of the main
problems with mental representation precisely have to do with how they are
to have a causal impact on the world. And I think it must be pointed out
that, even if we deny that (basic) mentality involves the more traditional
kinds of mental representation, we are still left with a serious interaction
problem. An interaction problem that basically comes about because visual
perception apparently allows us to directly engage with non-local entities
(and which is, as I have argued, precisely what makes vision deserving of the
name `representational'). Of course, it remains to be seen if no reductionistic
or eliminitavistic account can actually be given here. But if it can't (and
I do think that both reductionism and eliminativism are problematic) then
it does seem to me that many of the new non-representationalist accounts
largely leave the main problems untouched.
Let me start with eliminativism. If we choose to be eliminativists about the
phenomenology of vision, then again, there seem to be various options. First
of all, we might say that, rather than being immediately aware of something
distant and non-local, what we are actually immediately aware of is something
else, something local and internal to us. This leaves one with some version
of the representative theory of perception; vehicle-based representationalism.
Not, I suppose, a very desirable outcome.76 Another possibility is to say that,
76Why? Well, rst of all, it just doesn't seem to be \true to the phenomenology". As I
have pointed out, experiences seem to have a kind of transparency to them. What is phe-
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rather than being aware of an external object, one is actually aware of an
intentional content. In eect, one ends up with some version of content-
based representationism. Choosing the latter option eliminates the diculty
of accounting for how a spatially distant object can directly aect us in the
way visual phenomenology suggests. (For according to a widely held view,
intentional contents are not \object-involving.") However, this leaves one,
again, with the problem of how it is possible for intentional contents to have
an impact on the world. In any case, it seems that one ends up with either
one of the more traditional representational theories of visual perception.
And it is doubtful that this actually solves any of our problems.
Are there any other eliminativist options? Are there other ways to deny
that in seeing we are actually confronted with distant chunks of the envi-
ronment? It is dicult to think of any concrete examples, but I guess the
closest thing that comes to mind is a kind of dispositional account a la Daniel
Dennett.77
Unfortunately, I cannot give a full treatment here of Dennett's views. In
fact, I am going to be rather brief in my criticism with respect to the sort
of proposal that Dennett has on oer (or at least my understanding of it).78
Admittedly, I am also not sure if Dennett has ever been explicitly concerned
with our current problem. Especially my own formulation of it. However, I
nomenally manifest to us is what the experience is of, not the underlying vehicular process
that supports it. But vehicle-based representationalism is also undesirable for ontologi-
cal (due to its apparent commitment to the phenomenal principle) and epistemological
reasons (it sets up the dreaded veil of perception).
77See, e.g., (Dennett; 1988), (Dennett; 1991).
78I have considered including the account of George Rey here (Rey; 1983), but I am not
sure if he really belongs. This is because, on the one hand, he seems to be an elimina-
tivist about consciousness, whereas on the other hand, he appears to be a realist about
representational content. However, he also seems to think that representational states are
straightforwardly reducible to the kind of materialistic computational processes of clas-
sical cognitivism. And, therefore, it is doubtful if his representational states actually do
the required representational work. Anyway, I think Rey's account is close in spirit to
Dennett's. And my criticism of Dennett's view therefore also possibly applies to Rey's.
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think it is safe to say that, according to his line of thinking, the response to
our problem ought to go something like the following.
From a Dennettian point of view, we might say that, although it seems
as though we are actually aware of distant things in the outside world, we
are not really so aware; instead, we only think that we are directly aware of
the outside world. The latter of which simply reduces to being disposed to
behave and talk in a certain way.79 In other words, the world itself doesn't
really appear to you, you only think it does!
Let me briey say something about why I think this view is problematic.
If this line of thinking entails that we are not actually consciously open to
the (distant) world, then my main problem with this view, is that it seems to
lead to a certain kind of skepticism, or a-gnosticism. For if what I see before
me is not actually the world itself, but is rather, somehow, a symptom of
my own dispositions, then I simply don't know what \world" is anymore.
The consequence of this dispositional view seems to be that the term `world'
itself looses its very reference-base. When it comes to the reference-xation
of the term `world', it seems that some causal theory of reference is essentially
correct. After all, the fact that one even has a notion of the fact that there
is any such thing as \the world" at all is, rst and foremost, grounded in
conscious experience (recall the thing's I have said at the beginning of part
II). However, if what is phenomenally manifest to me in experience, and what
I have always ostensibly referred to as `the world', is not in fact the world,
then I guess I simply don't know anymore what \world" signies. (If that is
79That this would be an appropriate Dennettian response is perhaps best indicated
by the following fragment from a section of Consciousness Explained called `Seeing is
Believing': \Now you've done it. You've fallen in a trap, along with a lot of others.
You seem to think that there's a dierence between thinking (judging, deciding, being of
heartfelt opinion that) something seems pink to you and something really seeming pink
to you. But there is no dierence. There is no such phenomenon as really seeming {
over and above the phenomenon of judging in one way or another that something is the
case. ... There seems to be phenomenology...But it does not follow from this undeniable,
universally attested fact that there really is phenomenology" (Dennett; 1991, p. 364 {
366) (emphasis from the original text).
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not the world, then I don't know what is!) In eect, my world and some of
my most basic concepts are shattered, and it is indeed doubtful whether any
further discourse is even possible.
Or equally worse, on Dennett's account, it would seem that the world
is merely what I think or judge it is! At the very least, Dennett seems
to suggest that, phenomenologically speaking, there is nothing aside from
my own judgments. But it is dicult to see how this can be anything other
than cartesianism (or even idealism). An ironic consequence, given Dennett's
philosophical motivations! In any case, it renders deeply problematic how
I, and every one else, can have any basis for knowing what the world is
actually like if, phenomenologically speaking, everything is determined by
one's judgments. Yet I'd like to think that what appears to me in experience,
is at least partly anchored in something that exists outside and beyond me.
If that is not the case, then the very possibility of objectivity appears to fall
apart.80 A price, I believe, that is too high to pay.81
Admittedly, I don't know if this criticism is entirely fair to Dennett.
Maybe I am oversimplifying his views, or maybe I am merely setting up a
straw man here. But then again, it is often very dicult to discern just what
exactly Dennett's views are. In addition, I guess it is also just very dicult to
say what being an eliminativist about our apparent openness to the (distant)
world amounts to! Really, what does it mean to say that, most of the time,
you are not really seeing distant events and objects? Of course, the possibility
of hallucination and dreaming incredibly complicates everything. Indeed, if
such things as hallucinations and dreams simply did not exist, many of the
most intricate problems of philosophy would simply not arise! And I am
80For what I consider to be a similar point, see (Kim; 2000, p. 31).
81Not to mention the fact that such universal subjectivism is ultimately self-
undermining. Note also that appealing to some collective process of triangulation does
not seem to help much either, for all that one ends up with is simply more judgment. And
who knows that we are not perpetually in a collective state of mass-delusion?. Or worse,
if all that we have access to are our own judgments, then what grounds our judgment that
there is even a world at all?
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aware that, in the present context, it would be good to say a little more
about the implications of hallucinations and dreams, especially given my
present commitment to the idea that perception is direct. I am not going to
that, however. I guess that, ultimately, the supposition that we are genuinely
confronted with something outside of us, is something that is non-negotiable.
Whatever else is true, there is something \out there", outside and beyond
me. And I am looking at it! So although my arguments may be wanting, I
am simply going to assume that eliminativism about the phenomenology of
vision is wrong (or at least, not clearly dened). Let me, therefore, turn to
reductionism, which is where the really interesting problems are.
A reductionist account of the action at a distance that appears to charac-
terize visual phenomenology grants that the phenomenon is pretty much like
we think it is, but denies that it involves any problematic sort of interaction.
In other words, it denies that the apparent action at a distance, that seems
to take place when we see, is in any way instantaneous ( or `immediate',
or `fundamental'). Instead, it supposes that the phenomenon is ultimately
reducible, without remainder, to micro-physical interactions of an intuitively
unproblematic sort. Although it is true that we are visually aware of dis-
tant things and events, this awareness, and the kind of interaction that it
seems to aord, is entirely reducible to causal chains of contiguous physical
interactions that take place at the microscopic base-level of existence.
On the face of it, reductionism seems to be both plausible and desirable.
After all, it respects the phenomenological data, and it is in accordance
with how we suppose the physical world is like. Furthermore, it seems just
obvious that visual perception cannot be instantaneous action at distance,
because we know that visual perception is thoroughly mediated by physical
and physiological processes. It is common knowledge among most educated
people that seeing a distant object depends on a light source. Our seeing of a
distant object is mediated by the electromagnetic waves that are reected by
the object, and that reach out to us and stimulate our retina's. (Of course,
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a lot more is going on, but the point should be clear.) Without this whole
process, there would simply be no visual perceiving. So it seems nave and
outright false to suppose that there literally is a direct inuence between
us and the distant object. Visual perception does not involve instantaneous
action at a distance, and therefore it does not threaten our basic naturalistic
assumptions about how the world works.
To be sure, so far, no one seems to have come up with an actual account
of how we get from the physiological and physical details, to the event in
which the phenomenal grandeur and vastness of the world is allowed to come
to the fore, as part of a visual experience. And indeed, it is very dicult to
conceive of what such an account might look like. But this does not mean
that visual perceiving does not in fact exhaustively reduce to micro-physical
processes in the relevant way. And given the metaphysical stakes, it seems
therefore best to work with the assumption of reductionism.
Although I'm afraid that I won't be able to give any knock-down argu-
ments, I do want to formulate some concerns that I have about this reduc-
tionist proposal. For, intuitively, I feel that things don't \add up" in quite
the way that reductionism hopes. In any case, if reductionism is true, then it
just doesn't make sense why we see at all. If reductionism is true, then there
simply does not appear to be any purpose to the fact that we are actually
visually aware of things in the distance. And since I believe this is a rather
unlikely proposition, perhaps it is better to simply give up reductionism, and
think about new ways in which the dierent layers of existence might be
related. Let me explain.
First of all, let us reect on the reductionist supposition that, in reality,
the only things that exercise a direct causal inuence on us are physical forces
that are local to us in space and time. In the case of vision, the relevant
physical forces seem to be, mainly, the electromagnetic waves that stimulate
our retina's, and those that are implied by the further, internal processes,
that are thereby engaged. But consider now the following point: if the
electromagnetic stimuli and internal processing do all the causal work, then
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why should we also, in addition, see the distant object as well? Whatever the
answer, there is a strong temptation to say that, really, this is a very bad case
of causal over-determination. In any case, if the only things that can have a
direct causal impact must be physical processes that are immediately local
to us then, intuitively, it just doesn't make sense why we actually perceive
non-local things and events in the distance. Of course, the problem here is
essentially similar to the problem of the causal potency of content. Consider
the following comment by Jaegwon Kim:
Thus, that a given intentional state of an organism instantiates
a certain semantic property is a relational fact, a fact that es-
sentially involves the organism's relationship to various external
environmental and historical factors...If inner states are impli-
cated in behavior causation, it seems that all the causal work is
done by their \syntactic", or at any rate internal/intrinsic proper-
ties, leaving their semantic properties causally otiose. The prob-
lem of mental causation generated by syntacticalism therefore is
to answer the following question: How can extrinsic, relational
properties be causally ecacious in behavior production?
So the crux of the problem lies in the supposed fact that mental
properties, in particular , content properties...are relational prop-
erties, extrinsic to the organisms instantiating them, whereas we
expect the causative properties of behavior to be intrinsic and
internal. (Kim; 2000, p. 37)(Emphasis from the original text)82
It should be clear that something very similar is going on in visual percep-
tion. If only local causal forces are relevant to behavior, it would seem that
the distant object that we have in view in conscious experience, does not ac-
tually have any direct causal inuence on us in bringing about thought and
behavior. But then what is the point of seeing things in the distance? Why
82See also (Fodor; 1994) for an extensive treatment of this issue.
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does one see at all? Of course, in the previous case, we can simply elimi-
nate the notion of content from our theorizing. However, we cannot as easily
eliminate from out theorizing the fact that we seem to see non-local things
and events at various distances. Even if we we drain phenomenal experience
from all intrinsic contentfulness, the distant environment remains in view
nonetheless. Contrary to what the radical enactivists claim, supposing that
phenomenal experience is contentless does not actually solve the problems.
Some might object to all this that, in the previous kind of reasoning,
the problems arise because there is too much of an exclusive focus on sensory
stimulation. But everyone agrees that mere sensory stimulation is not enough
for full-blown perception. For this, something more is needed. There are
various theories about what this extra ingredient might be. There seem
to be roughly two kinds of proposals.83 According to the more traditional
view, what is needed are extra representational resources that are native to
the brain itself.84 More recent theories however, such as radical enactivism,
typically hold that, in order to get full-blown experience, sensation must
be supplemented by temporally extended dynamical interactions between
the organism and the environment.85 In any case, mere sensory stimulation
alone is not enough. Something extra is needed for actual perceiving.
However, I think that this criticism is besides the point. Of course, it
is true that a lot more processes beside retinal stimulation are involved in
producing, or realizing, visual experience. But as long as these processes are
internal to ourselves, or exclusively take place at the interface of our bodily
surfaces, nothing substantial is gained. And as far as I can discern, the kind
of processes that the aforementioned theories appeal to, all seem to fall in
this category. In any case, the picture that we are left with is still that of
an organism whose behavior is only directly causally inuenced by local or
83See (Hutto; 2011).
84A kind of Kantian strategy. See e.g. (Fodor; 1975, Ch. 1).
85See (Hutto and Myin; 2013, P. 158); a way of thinking that seems much inspired by
Gibson's ecological theory of perception (Gibson; 1972). See also (Chemero; 2009) for a
similar approach.
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internal factors. Moreover, appealing to representational contents that are
native to the brain would, in the present context, not be an option anyway.
For these either boil down to mere syntactic force, which makes their status as
representations immediately questionable, or they involve causally ecacious
contents, which is, as should be clear by now, equally problematic, especially
if we want to be reductionists.
So the only option left seems to be something like radical enactivism,
according to which intelligent, perception-guided, behavior is a matter of
being \information-sensitive" in the right way. However, I sincerely doubt
that the radical enactivists have the right tools to deal with phenomenal
experiences, especially those of the visual type. This is primarily because
they seem to want to account for phenomenal experience entirely in terms
of the idea that basic mentality, including our basic modes of perception, is
ultimately a matter of \information-sensitive responding".86 Although, from
an empirical-physiological point of view there is certainly much to be said
for this, it seems to me that the language of \responding" is inadequate to
capture or ground phenomenal experience. Indeed, I would say that things
are rather the other way around: many of our intelligent respondings are
precisely grounded in, or enabled by, (visual) phenomenal experience. In-
tuitively, phenomenal experience, characterized as it is by world-openness,
enlarges the spatiotemporal connes of the environment, and seems thereby
to facilitate a more extensive range of environmental oerings immediately
there for us to respond to. So rather than being itself wholly constituted by
\respondings", it would seem that phenomenal experience rather allows for
certain new types of responding to emerge.
To be sure, Hutto and Myin do speak of mentality as an \emergent"
phenomenon. For example, somewhere they state \Sentience and sapience
emerge through repeated processes of organismic engagement with environ-
mental oerings".87 However, I doubt that Hutto and Myin use the term
86See (Hutto and Myin; 2013, Ch. 4).
87See (Hutto and Myin; 2013, p. 8) (emphasis added by myself).
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`emergence' in its proper technical sense; the sense in which it denotes an
irreducible high-level phenomenon with new causal powers of its own (causal
powers that are irreducible to the sum of causal powers that are present in
its emergence-base). Given their naturalistic motivations, it is unlikely that
they actually endorse the thesis that mentality is a genuinely emergent phe-
nomenon. However, this does bring me to an important point; intuitively,
vision is supposed to allow the organism with new ways to interact with the
environment, but it seems that reductionism is unable to give an account of
how this could be so.
But let me turn to another consideration rst. If the reductionist is right,
then the only immediate causal determinants of our thoughts and behavior
are localized internally within us, or at the immediate surface of our bodies.
But if this is true, what to say, then, about so-called \phenomenal judg-
ments"? For they would seem to be, in some important sense, illusory.88
Look around you, and direct your attention to a reasonably distant ob-
ject in your visual eld. Notice how it seems, in its own way, present to you.
Pay close attention to the robustness of the fact that something in the dis-
tance seems to ll up your visual eld. As you do this, notice that you also
have the seeming ability to consciously reect on the distant object in all its
\suchness"; that you can in various way let your thoughts go over the object
(\what is that thing?") Indeed, notice that the object itself seems to be the
immediate object of your thinking. There seems to be no mistake about it:
because the object is there, showing itself in plain view, you can consciously
reect on it. In other words, there is a strong sense in which there is a special
{ admittedly dicult to describe { intimate immediacy between the object
that one sees and the judgments that one forms about it.
Yet if, as reductionism holds, the direct causes of your own thinking
processes are in fact entirely local and internal to you, then it would seem
that, in some strange way, all this is merely a kind of illusion. At the very
88See also (Chalmers; 1996, Ch. 5).
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least, it seems that the causal relation between the seeing that happens
\over here", and the object seen that is \over there", is not as it evidently
appears to be. As a matter of fact, not only would it seem that you are in a
fundamental way mistaken about the true cause of your judgments, it would
even seem that you are mistaken about the true cause of your very awareness
of the distant object itself. For in so far as your apparent awareness of the
distant object is rather an immediate result of what happens to you \over
here"; what phenomenally appears \over there" cannot actually be any direct
cause of what happens \over here". And so perhaps we may even correctly
conclude from this that you are not aware of anything distant at all.89 But,
reductionism precisely wants to save the phenomena! So this result seems
contrary to the reductionist motives. Does this mean that you cannot both
respect the phenomenological data and be a reductionist at the same time?
The reductionist might respond that the previous problems arise be-
cause we mistakenly suppose that awareness-at-a-distance happens at the
micro-physical level. In other words, the mistake is that we are looking for
awareness-at-a-distance at an ontological level that simply is too low. One
could argue that this is similar to trying to nd representation at any of
the sub-parts of an organism. It is only at the level of the organism as a
whole, that it is appropriate to speak of something being visually cognizant
of distant things and events; it cannot be found at lower levels of description.
In other words, the reductionist might suppose that, although no individual
component of the reduction-base is in the relevant way cognizant of the dis-
tant environment, the reduction-base, taken as a whole, is. After all, it seems
perfectly coherent to suppose that dierent micro-physical causes together
may form a macro-cause, and that the various micro-physical eects that
they bring about together form a macro-eect. Similarly, reductionists may
suppose that awareness-at-a-distance is a causal phenomenon that takes place
89Not, at least, in so far as being aware of something is a causal relation, of some sort,
between the act and object of awareness. But let us not go into any further complications
here.
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at a macroscopic level. So although, at the micro-physical level, nothing is
directly inuenced by the distant object that gures in visual perception, the
organism as a whole is.
This proposal is also, I believe, problematic. First of all, although we
might suppose that it is in fact the organism as a whole, rather than any
of its sub-parts, that is visually cognizant of the distant object, there still
remains a spatial gap between the micro-physical processes that together
constitute the organism as a whole, on the one hand, and the distant object
that is seen, on the other. So we are still confronted with the problem of
how a macro-physical entity can be visually inuenced, in the relevant way,
by another physical entity that is distant to it. It seems that, in order for
the distant object to make any sort of causal relevance to the macro-physical
entity, some sort of physical force must actually cross the gap and reach our
bodily surfaces. But then, again, we seem to end up with the problem of why
the distant object should enter our awareness at all, since all the relevant
causal work is still entirely local to us.
Of course, we may speculate that, perhaps the wave-particle duality of
light can give us the further resources that are needed to account for the
phenomenon of awareness-at-a-distance in vision. After all, if light is what
mediates the visual connection, by crossing the gap between the seer and the
seen, and light is also both eld-like and particle-like, then perhaps, if we
exercise our imaginations long enough, we may come to see how something
that reaches out to us can nevertheless contain some sort of reference to its
source. Although this is an interesting idea, and although there may be yet
other ways to \widen" the reduction-base, so as to cross the spatial gap, it
seems to me that reductionism, in any case, faces a more general diculty.
From the reductionist perspective, our being visually aware of distant things,
ultimately reduces, without remainder, to a set of low-level micro-physical
interactions. On this view, our visual-awareness-at-a-distance is a macro-
causal phenomenon, whose causal powers are nothing over and above the sum
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of causal powers that belong to its reduction-base components. Now although
there does not appear to be any strict logical impossibility in this view; it
does lead to very counter-intuitive results. The problems here precisely have
to do with the reductionist view that the causal powers of macro-phenomena
are nothing over and above the sum of causal powers of their reduction-
base components. This is counter-intuitive because, in our case, it would
seem that vision does not have any causal properties of its own. And so it
would seem that the macro-phenomenon of vision, qua vision, does not have
any true causal impact on the world. Again, the result is that it renders
unintelligible why we actually see the (distant) world at all.
To be sure, my concern here is not that, from a reductionist perspective,
there really is no such thing as genuine macro-causation.90 Very clearly, there
is macro-level causation. Even for the reductionist. It's just that macro-level
causation is exhaustively constituted by instances of micro-level causation.
Just because a table is nothing over and above the sub-atomic particles out
of which it is made, does not mean that there is no table. A similar thing
holds for macro-level causation. The problem, rather, lies in the fact that,
apparently, some macro-physical processes are in fact subjects of phenomenal
states, whereas others are not. And, from a reductionist perspective, there
really does not seem to be any rationale for why this should be so. Let me
try to explain why.
First of all, it seems correct to suppose that, when it comes to giving a
description of reality in macro-level terms, there is actually more than one
way to do this, and that, necessarily, there is a kind of arbitrariness involved
when it comes to which one of these ways we choose. This arbitrariness
seems to result from the fact that describing the world in macro-level terms,
requires that we \carve-up" the world in a certain way, whereas nature's own
\natural joints" only seem to be objectively pronounced at the microscopic
level. Of course, we might say that there do seem to be orderly and less
orderly ways of dividing up the world into macro-level phenomena. And
90See also (Kim; 2000, 77-80).
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indeed, some ways of articulating a macro-physical world seem to come more
natural than others. However, it would seem that the kind of patterns that
are, in this way, more salient to us than others, is more a function of our
own cognitive and perceptual apparatus than an actual dierence that is out
there in the world.91 Of course, this is not to say that the kind of patterns
that are salient to us do not actually exist. It's just that their salience is in
a sense agent-relative. From the cognitive point of view of a creature that is
wholly dierent from us, other patterns and orders might naturally be more
pronounced.
In any case, let's assume that there is a great variety of ways to carve
up and articulate a macroscopic world, and that any one of them is, in a
way, as good or arbitrary as the other. Although we might divide the world
into dierent macroscopic \units"; objectively, these ways of drawing the
boundaries are merely optional.
If we proceed further on the basis of this supposition, we must also say
that each way of articulating or carving out a macro-causal event is as good as
any other other. After all, each macro-causal event is nothing over and above
the sum of micro-causes and micro-eects to which it reduces. And so, in this
respect, they are really all the same. At the macroscopic level, we shouldn't
expect any fundamental (meta)physical dierences between various macro-
causal events. In the end, they all boil down to various sets of microscopic
interactions. Of course, we may favor some causal divisions over others, but
this seems to be primarily for practical reasons, rather than any metaphysical
reasons. Ultimately, all macro-level events seem to be on a par.
The thing with this whole story is that, although it sounds reasonable, it
does not seem to be entirely true. For contrary to our previous supposition,
it does seem to be the case that at least some macroscopic \carvings" are
naturally, in and of themselves, more pronounced than others. For notice
that, as human beings, we ourselves seem to have our existence at a very
91Consider, for example, the dierence between the way a language sounds to its native
speaker, and the way it sounds to a foreigner.
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specic macro-level of reality. After all, our bodies are macro-level entities.
But what seems to set them apart from other macro-level phenomena, is
that they have a very pronounced, non-arbitrary, natural unity to them. A
unity that is essentially dened by the fact that each human living body is
a subject of experience. Intuitively, not every arbitrarily carved-out macro-
physical process has such a special subjective unity to it. Rather, it seems
that only certain rather specic macro-level dened units are also subjects of
phenomenal experience. The problem, however, is that from a reductionist
point of view, it seems dicult to account for why exactly phenomenal sub-
jects are distributed in the particular way that they are at the macro-level,
and not in some other way.
Again, recall that any way of carving out a macro-causal event seems as
good as any other. They are just ever so many dierent ways of dening
a set of micro-causal events. Objectively speaking, no macro-causal events
seem to be more \unied" than others. It's all just a matter of how we
carve up the innite ocean of microscopic events that is our universe, into
larger macroscopic structures. Yet, it seems that, in some special cases, some
macro-level carving-outs do seem to be substantially dierent from others.
For it seems that the set of microscopic processes that these macro-carvings
pick out appear to be characterized by special sort of unity; a subjective
unity that is expressed by the fact that the microscopic processes that they
pick out together constitute a subject of experience.
However, the diculty with a reductionist approach, is that these macro-
subjective unities don't have any special causal status. Everything that these
macro-level structures bring about can be entirely accounted for in terms of
micro-physical causes and eects. In other words, although certain micro-
physical processes are subjectively unied in a seemingly substantial way;
it appears that this clear-cut macro-level individuality simply does not do
anything. It doesn't leave any extra traces on the world, except, apparently,
logically private ones. But why should macro-level individuals come into
existence if, as it seems, they don't do anything extra? If everything is
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exhaustively accomplished by micro-physical processes, then why should any
macro-level subjects appear to keep a check on things? Why should there
by macro-phenomenal worlds manifest at all? There just not seem to be any
rationale for it.
Of course, these \vertical" considerations do not in and of themselves
constitute a knock-down argument against reductionism. Perhaps it is just
a brute fact that some macro-level phenomena are subjects of experience
whereas others are not, everything else being the same. However, if we also
add here the \horizontal" problems that I considered earlier, it becomes in-
creasingly clear that there is something shy about reductionism. Especially
in the case of vision. If we consider how microscopic and the macroscopic
relate to each other \vertically", there does not seem to be any rationale for
why, somewhere along the way, aggregates of micro-physical processes should
be subjects of visual experience. And if we consider how the seer and the
seen are causally related \horizontally", we are again faced with the problem
of why there is seeing at all, given that the only real causal contributions of
vision must happen locally (i.e., internally and at the sensory surface). Of
course, this still does not constitute any eective knock-down of reduction-
ism. But still, it invites dicult questions that need to be answered.
What are the alternatives to reductionism? Intuitively, we may suppose that
visual-awareness-at-a-distance is really an emergent phenomenon. One that
brings into existence new causal powers of its own. The intuitive force of
emergentism with respect to vision stems from the plausible idea that vi-
sion primarily makes possible our ability to directly respond to the distant
environment, rather than that it already itself constitutes such responding.
It seems natural to suppose that only after vision has brought the distant
environment into view, can we eectively respond to and anticipate it. The
process of vision allows something that is external to that process to come
into view (this is what gives it its transparent character). However, it would
be counter-intuitive to suppose that this is an end in itself, and that the
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causal chain stops there. It seems more natural to suppose that the visual
process brings the distant object into view in order that the organism can
directly anticipate it from a distance, providing the organism with a kind
of premonition power. In other words, the process of vision seems to facil-
itate a further and direct causal connection between the organism and the
distant object, that is over and above, and irreducible to, the micro-physical
interactions from which it emerges.
Unfortunately, it is unclear whether such emergence is metaphysically
coherent. For it implies that there is some kind of downward causation
from macro-level phenomena to micro-level phenomena. And, as some have
pointed out, the idea of downward causation is problematic.92 A better alter-
native, perhaps, is holism, which I would dene as the view that, somehow,
all the various ontological strata, from the microscopic all the way up to the
macroscopic, are already necessarily co-occurent, in such a way that neither
one of them exclusively constrains all the others. In other words, it holds
that it is wrong to suppose that the microscopic has ontological precedence
over the macroscopic, and that it is better to say that microscopic phenom-
ena are always already subject to macroscopic constraints. This allows one
to say, for example, that smaller spatiotemporal slices are perhaps already
constrained by larger spatiotemporal slices (something that may perhaps al-
ready be implied by certain \eternalist" conceptions of time). Of course,
all this is not to say that everything is entirely constrained from the top
down. Perhaps the implication here is that `bottom-up' and `top-down' are,
ultimately, misleading notions when it comes to the true nature of reality.
Finally, it is perhaps worthwhile to point out, again, that the principle of
locality is not an uncontroversial premise anymore among theoretical physi-
cists and philosophers of physics. Certain results in quantum physics may
suggest that instantaneous action at a distance may in fact already take place
at the micro-physical level of reality.93 And again, the wave-particle duality
92See (Kim; 2006).
93See (Berkovitz; 2014).
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of light may suggest new ways to understand the phenomenology of vision.
For note that theoretical physicists nowadays usually seem to refrain from
giving any actual physical interpretations of their theories. But perhaps it
is interesting to play with the idea that the phenomenology of vision, and
the intrinsic properties of light, can maybe shed light on one another. More-
over, as some have noted, the kind of mechanistic view of physics on which
most of our current philosophical theorizing seems to be built, is really in
many respects \oversimplied" and out-dated. As David Bilodeau notes \As
Physics has developed, it has been necessary to include concepts which are
non-geometric in the Cartesian sense. A well-known example is the diculty
of formulating a mechanical description of the electromagnetic eld (i.e. de-
scribing the `aether' in terms of the motions of particles), and the eventual
abandonment of mechanical models and reliance on eld concepts as funda-
mental."94 So perhaps many of the issues that I have described are really
based on an inaccurate conception of physics to begin with. Who knows. In
any case, I believe that the diculties that seem to arise as soon as we try
to give a mechanical interpretation of vision, along the more familiar reduc-
tionist lines that I have proposed, and that seems the standard in most of
the philosophical literature, are certainly instructive.
V
It has been my concern to show that vision is straightforwardly a process
of representation. By allowing the distant environment to come into view,
vision allows the organism to anticipate things and events that, in a sense,
are still absent. This is essentially what makes vision a process of representa-
tion. Although this interpretation of the representational nature of vision is
somewhat unorthodox, in that it does neither involve, or is dependent on, the
claim that vision is indirect nor the claim that it is intrinsically contentful,
the problems that we are left with are still recognizably the kind of problems
94See e.g. (Bilodeau; 1996, p. 387).
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that we expect instances of representation to give rise to. Primarily the inter-
action problem that is posed by the action at a distance that is suggests by
the phenomenology of vision is problematic in this respect, and indeed much
reminiscent of the more traditional problem of the causal ecacy of content.
I have tried to show why I think that the phenomenology of vision is di-
cult to accommodate, given what we suppose the physical world is like. The
apparent action at a distance that is at work in vision appears to straightfor-
wardly contradict the familiar naturalistic assumption that the only direct
causal determinants of human thought and behavior are spatiotemporally
local. I have tried to give some reasons to suppose that eliminativism and
reductionism may be inadequate in the face of this contradiction. Alternative
metaphysical theories that suggest themselves are emergentism and holism.
Alternatively, developments in physics might suggest that mechanism and
locality are bad characterizations of the physical to begin with. Whatever it
might be, we need to come to grips with, and acknowledge, the apparent ac-
tion at distance that is suggested by visual phenomenology and that renders
vision as essentially a process of representation.
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